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Pommerening, Amy M. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. The Time of Liberation: 
Angela Davis’s Prison Abolition and Giorgio Agamben’s Coming Community. Major 
Professor: Leonard Harris.  
 
 
The project explores the ethical, social, and political subject of incarceration.  I 
investigate Angela Davis’s multifaceted critique of the prison industrial complex – 
focusing primarily on the tenets of racism, classism, and capitalism – and take an 
interdisciplinary approach to advancing her call for prison abolition by way of Giorgio 
Agamben’s radical adjustments to traditional discourses about ontology in his work The 
Coming Community.  Agamben’s rendering of ontology in terms of impotentiality and 
indifference, when put in dialogue with Davis, exposes latent and unexplored philosophic 
suggestions Davis is making – specifically regarding a non-normative interpretation of 
temporality and an operation of liberation best understood as indefinite rather than finite 
and attainable. Ultimately, the poetic re-thinking Agamben applies to ontology and its 
political consequences serve as one blueprint for the kind of cognitive re-orientation vital 
for the prison abolitionist project: abolishing the conditions which allow for the prison 
industrial complex to be an unquestioned, inevitable part of social reality.  Experimenting 
with thinkers that have seemingly disparate concerns and styles creates a space for more 
imaginative approaches to potentially mitigating limited, oppressive modes of thought, 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
i. Imagining the unimaginable 
  The problematic – the what-is-at-stake – in the current investigation is another 
way of living: an alternative way of thinking, acting, communicating, and organizing 
ourselves within local and global communities.  Though “alternative way of living” 
seems absurdly broad, in the context of the current project, it is quite specific.  To purport 
the following investigation has at stake an alternative way of living implies that modes of 
living as they are unfolding now are worthy of critique and displacement.  What follows 
is an investigation into prison abolition, and therefore, it is an investigation for a way of 
life that does not include the mechanisms and the use of the criminal justice and penal 
incarceration systems.  Time and temporality play a major role in understanding the 
alternative way of living without prisons.  The critique is not only of contemporary 
experience (personal, social, political, ideological) but also includes the dynamic of 
historical remembering (experiences of pastness which are and remain inseparable from 
the emerging now) as well as the dismissal of unimagined futures.  
  I argue that Agamben, in his book The Coming Community,
1
 demonstrates one 
possible way to alter our conceptual framework that would assist in Davis’s goal of  
                                                 
1 Agamben has written extensively in the fields of social and political philosophy, aesthetics, theology, and 







prison abolition.  The (nearly) inconceivable idea that Davis is suggesting we imagine 
requires not only a complicated proposal but one which deals with some of our most 
fundamental concepts as human beings: existence as such, identity, community, and 
temporality.  Alex Murray writes in Giorgio Agamben, “Agamben’s thought is 
characterized by the depth it provides in thinking through our contemporary moment, and 
on the importance that it places on imagining the world anew” (1).  Agamben’s “world 
anew” defines ontology as impotentiality, and this becomes the basis for what he calls the 
coming community: a community not defined with respect to predicate criteria and, 
therefore, one that consequently would abolish the inclusion/exclusion dialectic.  These 
alterations, occasionally supplemented by references to religious and philosophic 
traditions of Southeast Asia, offer one example of changes to our thinking that would 
allow us to begin to imagine Davis’s prisonless existence. 
  Though the problematic – the what-is-at-stake – is an alternative prisonless mode 
of existing, the practice of (criminal) imprisonment is not an isolated operation but is a 
segment of an immense constellation of oppressive and unjust practices.  The notion of a 
constellation is fitting for helping readers understand the following project, and the 
thinkers it focuses on: Angela Davis (1944-present) and Giorgio Agamben (1942-present).  
A constellation is a grouping of stars that structures an imaginary figure traced on the 
face of the sky.  It is an identifiable creation of the on-looker and is a product of the on-
looker’s imagination.  The constellation is one of an infinite number of possible 
constellations and is formed through a process of connecting: certain points are 
emphasized and then connected, or grouped, to make a figure.  However, this 





constellation or identifies one which has been previously imagined, there are no lines 
actually connecting the points.  The Big Dipper does not have a real, tangible border; it is 
a series of unconnected points.     
The constellation is pertinent to this project for a number of reasons.  First, 
individually, Davis and Agamben draw on a number of discourses, events, and analyses 
to structure their respective critiques regarding current modes of thinking and living.  Just 
as the stars and the on-looker are never static, so it is the case that the points which Davis 
and Agamben highlight (and their positions with respect to these points) are never static.   
  Davis asks in Are Prisons Obsolete?: “Why do we take prisons for granted?” and 
“Why should it be so difficult to imagine alternatives to our current system of 
incarceration?” (15, 105). Incarceration facilities are designations which unquestioningly 
populate the landscape.  The truly revolutionary and challenging aspect of Davis’s prison 
abolition is to imagine existing in a world without prisons.  She is attempting to create 
and introduce a never-before imagined constellation.  In Chapter Two, we will see why 
and how Davis defends the importance of this task.  The apparatuses that fuel the use and 
proliferation of the modern forms of criminal, social, and political imprisonment as well 
as the resultant social, economic, and political disappearance constitute and perpetuate 
unnecessary and indefensible human suffering.  Eliminating the conditions that sustain 
the practice of imprisonment, then, could be conceived of as an alternative mode of 
existing with a decreased level of human suffering.  Using the imagination in an 
unlimited, as opposed to limited, manner is the impetus to creating a prisonless society.    
   






The investigation of the problematic will begin with an explication of Davis’s 
prison abolition and is organized around each term: prison and abolition.  Both terms 
undergo a referential mutation in Davis.  Prison is no longer “an isolated institution” but 
a “set of relationships that comprise the prison industrial complex” (APO 106).  Davis 
demonstrates that there are other critical factors which need to be eliminated in order for 
prisons to truly be abolished.
2
  Since these factor are inseparable from the way humans 
are currently living, prison abolition is thus only possible with broader perceptual and 
social transformations.  Furthermore, abolition, for Davis, includes both negative and 
positive processes.  She positively proposes the creation of an abolition democracy – an 
alternative, prisonless society.   
 Davis claims that we must think poetically in order to imagine a prisonless society 
and thus begin the process for organizing ourselves in a way to render prisons obsolete.  
She admits to not providing a comprehensive step-by-step plan as to how we can alter our 
conceptual framework in such a way in which humans can begin to imagine the 
possibility of experiencing life without prisons.   
  Chapter Three will outline one of Agamben’s specific alterations to our patterns 
of thinking regarding ontology that has communicative and behavioral repercussions.   
    Ontology, politics and literature, and the relationships between them, are  
   the crucial topics of Agamben’s work…[and] arguably what emerges in  
                                                 
2 Davis’s critique of the prison industrial complex (PIC) largely focuses on racial and economic 
considerations in the United States.  The feminist/gendered, imperial, and xenophobic aspects of Davis’s 
analysis are given little to no attention.  This is not to suggest race, gender, class, imperialism, culture, 






   Agamben is a move towards a ‘poetics,’ a form of thinking that is not tied  
    to the limitations given to these areas, instead moving beyond the  
    entrapment of thought.  (Murray 5) 
Though Agamben does not specifically address Davis nor the notion of prison abolition, 
Agamben supplements Davis in a way which provides an answer to Davis’s question of 
what conceptual changes could garner the type of re-orientation needed to begin to 
imagine a prisonless existence (i.e. coming community). 
  Using Agamben as an experimental aid to Davis’s prison abolitionism actually 
exposes some latent and unexplored philosophic suggestions in Davis regarding 
temporality, which are outlined in Chapter Four.  In Infancy and History: On the 
Deconstruction of Experience, Agamben makes the claim that “the original task of a 
genuine revolution, therefore is never merely to ‘change the world,’ but also – and above 
all – to ‘change time’” (99).  Davis asserts that prison abolition is both existent in the 
present and in the future.  Scholars of Davis’s work have yet to adequately account for 
this non-linear temporality; it is a complicated philosophic claim. Agamben’s concept of 
the coming community gives us a way of thinking through Davis’s claim with a revised 
ontological lens grounded in impotentiality.  Davis’s temporal assertions compliment and 
align with her claim that the struggle for liberation is indefinite.     
  Chapter Five focuses on modes of resistance.  In Davis’s writings about political 
prisoners and her historical understanding of the struggles for black liberation, she 
gestures towards implicating the state as a potential locus to concentrate resistance.  A 
mode of resistance that refuses to become placated or absorbed by changes in the law 





dissenter’s criticism (i.e. the state) could be a viable route for realizing prison abolition 
and ultimately undermining what Davis describes as “the ravages of global capitalism” 
altogether (AD 89).  Agamben uses the incident at Tiananmen Square as a paradigm for 
effective resistance against the state.  Davis’s own prison abolitionism opens up the 
potential for rendering the state inoperable – using Agamben’s words – and prison 
abolitionists should consider the mode of resistance Agamben describes using Tiananmen 








CHAPTER 2.  ANGELA DAVIS AND PRISON ABOLITION 
i.  Introduction  
Davis claims that we must think poetically – that is, more complexly than our 
current conceptual frameworks allow – in order to imagine a prisonless society and thus 
begin the process for organizing ourselves (i.e. creating a community) in a way to render 
prisons obsolete.  Davis’s prison abolitionism is a constellation of arguments and looks 
broadly at the issues which contributed to the creation and continued proliferation of 
prisons: capitalism, racism, sexism, gender repression, militarism, xenophobia, and 
nationalism.  Davis critiques these institutions and ideologies and argues for their 
destruction.  At the same time, prison abolition, according to Davis, is not exclusively a 
negative or destructive process.  Positively, Davis proposes in Abolition Democracy: 
Beyond Empire, Prisons, and Torture the creative re-organization of “networks for 
resistance”3 and “communities of struggle” as a means for dismantling the existent 
conditions that allow for the inevitability of prisons (121, 108).  Moreover, Davis 
positively proposes the creation of an abolition democracy – her term for the imagined, 
prisonless society.  The destruction is accompanied by construction of alternative 
economic, governmental, and institutional forms.   
    
                                                 





  Prison abolition is fundamentally a struggle for liberation.  However, liberation 
for the prison abolitionist is not reserved for incarcerated individuals.  Rather, it is a more 
extensive existential human liberation with the imagination as the impetus for altering our 
modes of awareness and communication, which allows for radically different possibilities 
for being in the world.   
    
ii.  Prison abolition 
  On one level, what prison abolition denotes seems obvious: to abolish or 
eradicate prison.  Though this is not technically incorrect, such an understanding is 
grossly incomplete if by prison one thinks only of a punitive architectural structure 
containing people accused or convicted of crimes and abolition as only a negative 
process.  These associations are part of a multifarious network of meanings.  In order to 
comprehend what Davis means by prison abolition, a detailed analysis of the terms 
prison and abolition are needed.   
    
ii.a.  Prison and the prison industrial complex 
   Prison, as it is used in prison abolition, refers to the prison industrial complex 
(PIC): the architectural sites of all types of punitive incarceration
4
 and surveillance as 
well as the economic, governmental, ideological, and cultural values that created, permit, 
and support the continual use of such facilities and the criminal justice system more 
                                                 
4 In the United States, the Federal Bureau of Prisons is overseen by the Department of Justice and incudes 
public and private federal prisons.  In addition, each state has a Department of Corrections in charge of 
correctional facilities including public and private local, county, and state jails and prisons.  Juvenile 
detention centers are also part of the Department of Corrections.  Immigration detention centers are 
under the jurisdiction of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an agency of the Department of 





broadly.  The PIC is not only about prisons proper but is meant to include multiple kinds 
of incarceration facilities and surveillance.
5
  For the United States, this includes: local 
and county jails, juvenile detention centers, state and federal prisons, work-release 
centers, military prisons and black sites, immigrant detention centers, Indian country 
adult and youth detention centers, wilderness camps, training-schools, psychiatric 
facilities, halfway houses, house arrest, parole, and probation.
6
  The term prison 
industrial complex itself is pejorative in tone and was first used in 1995 by Mike Davis 
for an article written in The Nation.  It indicates a critical approach to interpreting the 
practice of incarcerating people for criminal punishment or while awaiting charge and 
verdict.  According to Davis, PIC is used to shift the “attention from the prison, perceived 
as an isolated institution, to the set of relationships that comprise” the criminal justice 
system and society more broadly (APO 106).     
   The phrase prison industrial complex is a modification of an early term military 
industrial complex (MIC), which entered broad, public discourse when former President 
of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower used the phrase in his public farewell address 
on January 17, 1961.  President Eisenhower said, “In the councils of government, we 
must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, 
by the military industrial-complex.”  One often cited manifestation of the MIC, according 
to Katherine A. Neill and Mathew J. Gable, is “the way in which military buildup during 
                                                 
5 Mechthild Nagel and Anthony J. Nocella II in their “Introduction” to The End of Prisons: Reflections 
from the Decarceration Movement define prison as “an institution or system that oppresses and does not 
allow freedom for a particular group” (3).  Included for Nagel and Nocella in this definition are 
spaces/structures such as daycare centers and parks, among others. 
6 In Prison Privatization: The Many Facets of a Controversial Industry (Volume I: The Environment of 
Private Prisons), Anne Lee explains in “Private Prisons and Community Corrections” the term community 
corrections is sometimes used to indicate “probation and parole supervision as well as other intermediate 







the Cold War has led to a situation in which the U.S. government is now almost 
compelled to sustain mass production of weapons and an enormous military 
infrastructure” (94).  The MIC extends beyond the development and production of 
weapons and maintaining basic operations of the military.  James Ledbetter, in 
Unwarranted Influence: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military-industrial Complex, 
adds, the MIC is “a network of public and private forces that combine a profit motive 
with the planning and implementation of strategic policy” (6). The idea is that multiple 
public and private apparatuses monetarily depend upon the military (e.g. defense 
contractors, military technology developers, military personnel) and thus have an interest 
in military policy and ventures for reasons other than threats to national sovereignty or 
humanitarian concerns.   
 The PIC adopts a structurally similar criticism and applies it to the criminal 
justice system, but it is important to keep in mind, as Davis explains, the “relationship 
between the military industrial complex and the prison industrial complex” could be 
called symbiotic since “these two complexes mutually support and promote each other 
and often share technologies” (APO 86).  Though the particular operations of the PIC are 
contextual, central to the general critique is: 1) the role of capitalism, particularly the 
mechanisms of imperial capitalism of the 19
th





 centuries; 2) social control.  In The Prison Industrial Complex and the Global 
Economy, Eve Goldberg and Linda Evans see the PIC as “an interweaving of private 
business and government interests” (7).  Interests in profit, social and political power, and 
maintaining the status-quo, not the threat of criminal behavior to society, are aspects 






complex (CCC) has been introduced as an alternative to the PIC to further emphasize the 
profit interest of commercial enterprises involved in the practice of penal incarceration.  
In “The Corrections-Commercial complex: A High-Stakes, Low-Risk Business,” Neill 
and Gable define CCC as “a subgovernmental arrangement between three coalitions of 
interested groups: private corporations (the prison industry), corrections professional 
organizations, and government agencies” (89).   
   Before addressing specific ways in which commercial, or profit, interests are 
fueling and benefitting from incarceration, it is important to briefly outline the role of 
neoliberalism.  Rose M. Brewer and Nancy A. Heitzeg in their article “The Racialization 
of Crime and Punishment: Criminal Justice, Color-Blind Racism, and the Political 
Economy of the Prison Industrial Complex” state that “multinational globalization in 
search of cheaper and cheaper labor and profit maximization is part and parcel of the 
growth of the prison industrial complex” (625).  In very basic terms, neoliberalism refers 
to globalization, or a global integration, of the economy.  As business entities secured 
cheaper labor outside the United States, laborers and local economies reliant upon the 
skilled and unskilled jobs saw personal wealth, opportunities for economic security and 
social mobility, public funds to invest back into the community, and social safety nets 
rapidly erode.  Moreover, in “Class, Race, and Hyperincarceration in Revanchist 
America,” Loïc Wacquant details how the “postindustrial economic transition…shifted 
employment from manufacturing to services, from central city to suburb, and from 
Rustbelt to the Sunbelt and low-wage foreign countries” (81).  Immigration patterns of 
corporations in search of cheap labor abroad as well as domestic need for cheap labor are 






  There are many ways that commercial enterprises profit from incarceration.  One 
example is the use of inmate labor.  In “The High Costs of Profit: Racism, Classism and 
Interests against Prison Privatization,” Nancy A. Heitzeg documents a portion of the 
companies which use prison labor:  
    AT&T Wireless, Boeing, Compaq, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Honeywell,  
   IBM, Intel, Levy, Lucent Technologies, Macy’s, Microsoft, Motorola,  
   Nordstroms, Nortel, Northern Telecom, Pierre Cardin, Revlon, Starbucks,  
   Target Stores, Texas Instrument, 3Com, TWA, Victoria Secret, and more.  
   (38)  
Inmate labor is not an employment training program; that is, companies that use 
incarcerated individuals as laborers do so with no intention of providing employment 
after release.  Inmate labor reduces a company’s labor costs through low wages.  The 
location and type of incarceration facility as well as the particular company using inmates 
as laborers are variables that contribute to the wage rate.  Generally, wages range 
between “two cents to two dollars per hour” (Heitzeg 36).7        
  Commercial enterprises are not the only entities which benefit from cheap inmate 
labor.
8
  State and local municipalities use low-paid and unpaid inmates to maintain public 
parks and buildings; this is in addition to state and local municipalities benefitting from 
forced community service penalties of non-incarcerated people that serves no 
                                                 
7 Heitzeg later says, “[c]heap inmate labor, as low as twenty-one cents per hour, produces everything from 
blue jeans to auto parts, electronics and toys, computer circuit boards, and packaged plastic eating utensils 
for fast-food restaurants” (41). 
8 Abe Louise Young, in an online article published on July 21, 2010 for The Nation titled “BP Hires Prison 
Labor to Clean Up Spill While Costal Residents Struggle,” found that in Louisiana: “Prisons and parish 
jails provide free daily labor to the state and private companies like BP, while also operating their own 






rehabilitative or educational purpose.
9
  The Federal government also benefits monetarily; 
cheap inmate labor is “the major supplier for the U.S. military, ranking among the top 
fifty suppliers for the army alone” (Heitzeg 38). 
  In addition to low wages, commercial enterprises profit from using inmate labor 
in other ways.  Inmates are not guaranteed the protection of federal labor standards.  
Leslie Taylor-Gover and Robert T. Carey explain that businesses using inmate labor:  
    …do not have to pay for benefits…or work related injuries, and they do  
   not have to negotiate with labor unions or federal agencies that regulate  
   equal employment and discrimination.  The companies are also protected  
    from lawsuits that may be filed by prisoners. (82) 
Companies do not have to provide health care or retirement benefits, do not have to pay 
worker compensation for injuries sustained while working, which would raise the 
company’s worker compensation insurance rates, and inmates are prohibited from 
forming unions or filing lawsuits directly against the companies.
10
   
  Private firms are also contracted to provide services within incarceration facilities.  
“These include food service (Sodexho is the largest provider), phone service,11 privatized 
health care and treatment provided by managed care corporations…,conservative 
Christian religious programming,” drug testing suppliers, and security and surveillance 
                                                 
9 In the state of Tennessee, as outlined in the Tennessee Comprehensive Driver License Manual, individuals 
with no prior criminal record convicted of Driving Under the Influence (DUI), which applies to alcohol, 
illicit drugs, prescription drugs, and over-the-counter medications, are sentenced to mandatory jail time, 
must pay a fine, and are subject to loss of license and/or restricted license.  Additionally, Tennessee also 
“requires as a condition of probation, litter pick-up for three eight-hour shifts.  While removing litter, the 
offender has to wear a vest or other clothing displaying the message: ‘I am a DRUNK DRIVER’” (81).  
10 Tax credits and subsidies such as Prison Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP) are further 
examples of the financial benefits for companies using inmate labor. 
11 “Phoning Home: Prison Telecommunications in a Deregulatory Age” in Volume II of Prison 
Privatization: The Many Facets of a Controversial Industry by Stephen Raher gives an extensive account 






services (Heitzeg 39).  The goal for these service providers is to secure contracts with 
incarceration facilities in order continue to remain in business and make a profit.  The 
viability of such private firms relies upon the existence of incarceration facilities.   
  Finally, the most obvious profit-motivating feature of the PIC is the use of private, 
for-profit prison corporations.
12
  Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) formed in 
1983 as the “first contemporary corrections provider” (Neill & Gable 92).  It sought to 
redefine the working relationship between private business and the government by 
proposing to manage incarceration facilities in a more cost-effective manner than 
facilities operated by the government.  The timing of the creation of CCA is notable.  
Immediately after former President Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, the start 
of a series of strict drug laws began being enacted.  As incarceration facilities across the 
country rapidly filled, CCA formed as  
    ...a response to a perceived need among states such as Tennessee for  
   additional space to warehouse criminals in order to comply with court  
    rulings declaring the conditions of [the state’s] overcrowded prisons  
    unconstitutional. (Neill & Gable 92) 
CCA is now the largest private, for-profit prison operator, a multinational corporation, 
and “has an annual revenue of $1.7 billion” (Heitzeg 39).  GEO Group (formerly 
Wackenhut) is the next largest private, for-profit corrections provider.  It has operations 
globally, a bed capacity of 87,000, and reported revenues of $1.69 billion in 2014.  Both 
of these corporations are traded on the New York Stock Exchange and “boast of investors 
                                                 
12 Public-run facilities are those managed by local, state, and federal government agencies and departments.  
The facilities are funded using money collected from taxes and other forms of government revenue.  Private 
facilities are those managed by private firms.  Privately-run facilities do not necessarily have to be for-






such as Chevrolet, Exxon, Ford, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, Texaco, UPS, 
Verizon, and Wal-Mart” (Heitzeg 39).  GEO Group advertises its real-time stock 
exchange figures on the home page of its website.  The existence and viability of private, 
for-profit incarceration management companies like CCA and GEO Group depend upon 
the usage of penal incarceration and also have a business interest in the expansion of 
penal incarceration in the United States and globally. 
   It is not only the participation of commercial enterprises which shape the 
understanding of the PIC.  Recall that Goldberg and Evans stated that the PIC is “an 
interweaving of private business and government interests” (7).  Campaign contributions 
from incarceration-related businesses,
13
 the employment opportunities incarceration 
facilities provide for a community, the popular appeal of government officials being 
perceived as tough on crime, and the claim of a reduction of government spending with 
the introduction of private, for-profit facilities
14
 are some of the government-related 
interests of the PIC.  
   More importantly, some of the aforementioned aspects of “government interests” 
lead into the broader idea of social control – the second identified critique of the PIC.  
                                                 
13 A section of Benjamin R. Inman’s “The Prison Doors Swing Both Ways: Elite Deviance and the 
Maintenance and Expansion of the Market of Prison-Industrial Complex” in Volume III of Prison 
Privatization: the Many Facets of a Controversial Industry specifically deals with campaign contributions 
by the various sectors of business with interests in the criminal justice and penal incarceration systems. 
14 Neill and Gable explain that the cost-benefit/cost-savings argument used by supporters of private, for-
profit incarceration facilities follows a typical line of reasoning: “full government control of prison 
operations leads to waste and inefficiency and…the private sector, free from procedural constraints and 
spurred by competition, can provide better outputs at a lower cost than the public sector” (94).  However, 
there are complications with even making such comparisons between publicly and privately run facilities.  
Neill and Gable point out that the private facility cost-saving “rhetoric…has continued despite the 
difficulties of making adequate comparisons between public and private facilities and despite evidence 
suggesting that contracting out for the management of corrections does not save taxpayers money and can 
lead to even worse prison conditions for inmates” (94).  In “Comparing Public and Private Prisons: The 
Trade-offs of Privatization,” Benjamin R. Inman discusses the complications with determining whether 






Social control is “the means by which collectives secure adherence to ideational and 
behavioral norms and curtail disruptive deviance” (Soss et. al 536).15  Proponents of the 
PIC argue that marginalized populations – economic, racial, religious, ethnic, 
gender/queer, political – are systematically incarcerated or surveilled since they are likely 
to be perceived as challenging the established, hegemonic order.  Terance D. Miethe and 
Hung Lu in Punishment: A Comparative Historical Perspective note:  
    civil and criminal laws have been widely used over time and across  
   different countries to disrupt, harass, imprison, and/or eliminate particular  
   individuals and social groups that represent a threat to the prevailing  
   authorities. (200-1)   
Again, critics of the PIC reject the reason for the global growth of the various means of 
imprisonment as a response to increased criminal activity threatening public safety.
16
  
The incarceration of revolutionaries and political dissenters, non-gender conforming 
peoples, racially, ethnically, economically, and/or religiously marginalized peoples is not 
due the fact that these people are essentially more dangerous or transgress more laws 
within a given society than people who are not marked in these ways; it is because these 
people are perceived as threatening.   
   Davis is one among many critics of the PIC who points to the United States to 
highlight how social control of marginalized populations operate.  At around two and a 
half million, the United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world – though 
                                                 
15 Ideational and behavior norms are not necessarily benevolent, equitable, or just.  Racial, chattel slavery 
was at one point a norm in the United States.  Deviance to this norm would include insurrections, escapes, 
and covert networks like the Underground Railroad.   
16 Statistics in the United States have shown that “the population behind bars has kept on growing even as 






countries like China and India have far more people.  Adding the people who are under 
surveillance of some kind (e.g. parole, probation, and house arrest with electronic 
monitoring), the total is around seven million.  “This is roughly one out of every thirty-
two adults in the United States” (Neill & Gable 93).  These adults (and children charged 
as adults) are disproportionately part of the economic underclass and particularly are 
people of color.
17
  Bryon E. Price and Richard Schwester in their article, “Economic 
Development Subsidies and the Funding of Private Prisons,” contend this occurs 
“because minorities are thought to ‘threaten the existing distribution of economic rewards 
and political power’” (111).  Heitzeg explains, “Despite no statistical difference in rates 
of offending, the poor, the undereducated, and people of color, particularly African 
Americans, are overrepresented in these statistics at every phase of the criminal justice 
system” including the juvenile criminal justice system (46).18   
 
ii.a.2. Dehumanization    
  For Davis, the PIC is an indefensible mechanism of violence and brutality, and 
more specifically, it is a mechanism which dehumanizes.  Dehumanization is an act or 
acts which uncouples the humane consideration and treatment from a human being.  
David Livingstone Smith in “Dehumanization, Essentialism, and Moral Psychology” 
describes dehumanization as having and continuing to play “a significant role in 
facilitating and motivating episodes of genocide, war, slavery, and other forms of mass 
                                                 
17 In The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander finds: “One in three young African American men will serve 
time in prison if current trends continue, and in some cities more than half of all young adult black men are 
currently under correctional control—in prison or jail, on probation or parole” (9). 
18 Heitzeg uses the case of drug offenses to support this claim: “African Americans, who are thirteen 
percent of the population and fourteen percent of drug users, represent thirty-seven percent of the people 






violence” (815).  Looking at the practice of racial, chattel slavery in the United States 
helps to underscore what dehumanization means for Davis.  A “slave is transmogrified 
from human subject into a physical object…reduced to moveable form of property known 
as ‘chattel’” (Best 25).  Slave abolitionists “viewed the institution of slavery as inherently 
evil, corrupt, and dehumanizing, such that no [slave] in bondage – however well-treated 
by their ‘masters’ – could attain full dignity, intelligence, and creativity of their humanity” 
(Best 25).     
  Davis claims the PIC dehumanizes on multiple levels.  Within the walls of 
incarceration facilities, mental and physical brutalities are integral parts of the 
environment.  Inmates often describe the existence in an incarceration facility in terms of 
survival.  Shaka Senghor spent nineteen years in prison and seven of those in solitary 
confinement.  In his memoir, Writing My Wrongs: Life, Death, and Redemption in an 
American Prison, he states: “For the lowest of the inmates to the highest reaches of the 
prison staff, life in jail was a real-life human experiment of survival of the fittest” (28).  
One does not live in an incarceration facility; one tries merely to survive incarceration. 
Practices like solitary confinement, death row and the death penalty, sexual abuse, 
frequency of physical assaults and deaths among prisoners and officials, and medical 
neglect replace “living” with “survival.”  
  Davis believes dehumanization is an intrinsic aspect in the ideological 
components which define the PIC.  She is a staunch anti-capitalist and considers 
capitalism to be inherently repressive and exploitive.  In the course of being concerned 
with profit, capitalism “produc[es] the means to main and kill human beings and devour 






PIC shifts the interest from retribution and rehabilitation to economic viability.  Market 
centrality allows for and encourages investment in architecture, technologies, and the 
proliferations of commodities prison populations consume and produce (AD 114).  In this 
way, the practice of penal incarceration is viewed as an opportunity to make investors 
and companies more profitable, and inmates are considered non-human or objects – as 
was the case with racial, chattel slavery.  People are seen as a means to an end with no 
regard for their physical, psychological, and social livelihoods.      
  Furthermore, as Smith rightly points out, if certain behaviors or actions are 
objected to on the basis that they dehumanize, there is simultaneously an implicit or 
explicit claim about what it means to be human (819).  Davis does link the 
dehumanization of PIC to the erosion of “democratic rights and liberties” (AD 122).  In a 
sense, one who is not dehumanized is one whose democratic rights and liberties have not 
been eroded on Davis’s account.  Obviously, the function of incarceration is to restrict 
certain liberties as a means of punishment.  Davis is not only referring to the act of 
incarceration but also to something much deeper than not being able to decide when or 
what one eats for instance.  Instead, she believes prisons “constitute extreme sites where 
democracy has lost its claims” (AD 124).   
  There are certain features which characterize what democracy means.  These 
features may change depending upon the context in which democracy is defined or what 
type of qualifier accompanies the word democracy (e.g. liberal democracy, direct 
democracy, etc.).  A dominant, democratic, feature of the present-day United States is an 
adult citizen’s right to vote.  One reason Davis believes incarceration facilities are 






temporary and/or permanent disenfranchisement.  Not only are incarceration facilities 
actually the place where people are denied this democratic feature of voting,
19
 but this 
denial can be extended after people are released.  Those on parole or probation are denied 
the right to vote in a number of states, and some are permanently disenfranchised.  In 
other words, once someone has “served their time” or repaid their “debt to society,” the 
punishment continues.  With the denial of the right and duty to vote, voting 
disenfranchisement is an explicit means for silencing and disappearing someone.  
Disappearance (physical and social) is a manner in which social control operates via the 
PIC.  In a representational government, the ability to vote is the ability to be heard and 
recognized.   
 Formerly incarcerated individuals are continually stigmatized after their release 
in other ways.  Social mobility is stifled not only through the problems surrounding 
unemployment post-release but also through laws that deny education loans to those 
convicted of certain felonies, and the “federal law forbid[ding] ‘veterans’ benefits, 
welfare payments, food stamps and disability support to anyone who is an inmate for 
more than 60 days” (Mendieta 306).  All these taken together support Davis’s claim that 
incarceration facilities represent “state-sponsored terrorism against its citizens” (AD 67).  
The punishment that follows a formerly incarcerated individual is a type of violence that 
removes “citizens from the cycle of the production of social wealth, and contribute to 
their prolonged exclusion from such a cycle” (Mendieta 306).  This is why in Are Prisons 
Obsolete? Davis speaks of the permanent social banishment of inmates and the formerly 
incarcerated.   
                                                 






  ii.b. Abolition 
  What then would it mean to be a prison abolitionist given Davis’s understanding 
of prison to mean the PIC?  It means the abolition of broader ideological, economic, and 
behavioral systems.  “The abolition of prisons is the abolition of the instruments of war, 
the abolition of racism, and, of course, the abolition of the social circumstances” that 
contribute to populating the prisons in the first place (AD 74).   
  Davis’s use of the term abolition is meant to invoke pre-Civil War and Civil War 
era slave abolition movements.  Davis reminds us that those subject to imprisonment are 
specifically excluded from the Thirteenth Amendment, which declares: “Neither slavery 
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have 
been duly convicted shall exist within the United States, or any other place subject to 
their jurisdiction” (U.S. Const. amend. XIII, sec. 1).  This is a crucial point for Davis in 
demonstrating the function of the term abolition in the context of prison abolition.     
   This late twentieth-century “abolitionism,” with its nineteenth century  
   resonances, may also lead to a historical recontextualization of the practice  
    of imprisonment. With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, slavery  
    was abolished for all except convicts – and in a sense the exclusion from  
    citizenship accompanied by the slave system has persisted within the US  
    prison system. (RC 72) 
The Thirteenth Amendment permits slavery and involuntary servitude for those convicted 
of a crime; thus, the practice of slavery was never entirely abolished with the passage of 
the Thirteenth Amendment.  Brewer and Heitzeg note that this “loophole” had “allowed 






continuing the same struggle as slave abolitionists – the struggle to end the practice of 
slavery in the United States.  Moreover, prison abolitionists are insistent that white 
supremacy (and anti-black racism) was reinforced and codified in law – despite the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  “The abolition of slavery did not result in the abolition of the 
essentialist racism in the law; it merely called for new methods of legally upholding the 
property interests of Whiteness” (Brewer & Heitzeg 631). 
  The connection, however, between slavery and criminal incarceration in 
American history existed well before the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and 
extends back to the colonial period.  Matthew T. King details: “In 1697, England 
introduced prison labor in the form of transportation to North America” (13).  
Transportation, in this context, refers to the process of sending individuals found guilty of 
a crime from England to North America for hard labor as indentured servants or 
permanent slaves.  Prior to the practice of transportation being a formal law, “[c]onvicted 
felons could petition for a pardon on the condition that they agreed to be transported to an 
American colony for slave labor” (King 13).  After transportation became a “formal law” 
with the Transportation Act of 1718, judges were able to “sentence offenders to 
transportation and avoid the process of allowing pardons in lieu of sentencing” (King 13).    
 After the Revolutionary War, transportation waned and eventually ceased.  
However, the connection between forced labor and criminal punishment continued in the 
penitentiary system in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  The comparisons between 
the practice of incarceration and the practice of slavery were drawn by both advocates 
and proponents of the use of penitentiaries.  Adam Jay Hirsch in The Rise of the 






publicists…explicitly termed their proposals for workhouses and hard labor by criminals 
as ‘slavery’ programs, and some advocates continued to describe inmates as slaves after 
penitentiaries went up” (74).20  Davis notes that “some antislavery advocates spoke out 
against the new system of punishment during the revolutionary period” (APO 26-7).  
However, the shift from public corporal/capital punishment as the principle form of 
punishment to the penitentiary system – when incarceration became the punishment itself 
– “was generally viewed as a progressive reform” (APO 27).   
   Hirsch demonstrates well before the Civil War and the passage of the Thirteenth 
Amendment that “[a]mong the institutions that hovered about the penitentiary” slavery 
was the “one that stood out” in the discussion and writings from that period (71).  Some 
formal similarities exist between the pre-Civil War penitentiary system and racial, chattel 
slavery.  As Hirsch notes:  
    Both institutions reduced their subjects to dependence on others for the  
   supply of basic human services such as food and shelter.  Both isolated  
    their subjects from the general population by confining them to a fixed  
    habitat.  And both frequently coerced their subjects to work, often for  
    longer hours and for less compensation than free laborers. (71)  
Inmates in pre-Civil War penitentiaries were subject to threats and endured physical 
violence and death as a form of discipline analogous to the experience of many slaves.  
The Slave Codes in the South “authoriz[ed] corporeal chastisement of slaves to the point 
of death” not to mention the torture, rape, murder, severing of familial ties executed with 
                                                 







impunity by slave owners (Hirsch 73).  Rules within the penitentiary “prescribing 
corporal punishments that had disappeared outside the prison walls mirrored these [slave] 
codes” (Hirsch 73).  Hirsch catalogs other formal similarities of the two institutions 
including a shared nomenclature.  For instance, the “‘overseer’ sided in the penitentiary 
as well as the plantation, and he supervised the performance of ‘hard labor’” (Hirsch 72).  
Inmates and slaves used violent and non-violent means to “escape.”  Prison officials and 
slave owners “expressed intense, even paranoid, fear of insurrection” (Hirsch 72).  Both 
systems relied on marking people (uniforms and skin color) in order to distinguish people 
from the free population.   
These formal similarities existed between the two institutions well before the end 
of the Civil War, and most penitentiaries during this time were located outside of the 
states which formed the Confederacy – where racial, chattel slavery was most prominent.  
In the Northern and deep Southern states prior to the end of the Civil War, penitentiaries 
were mainly populated with marginalized immigrant (referred to as “foreign-born”) 
peoples.
21
  Southern states that were closer to the free states did have a disproportional 
representation of freed black people in their penitentiaries.   
The rise of the black prison population – and prisons more generally – happened 
after the Civil War and was concentrated in the former states of the Confederacy.  Davis 
aligns her view of the modern U.S. prison system, as it has developed post-Civil War, 
with W.E.B. DuBois, who saw the rise of criminalization and incarceration of black 
people as a continuation of racial slavery.  After the Civil War:  
                                                 
21 People of these “foreign born” communities were racialized – considered racial “others” through 
associations with essential characteristics – and the racialization operated on ethnic, linguistic, religious, 






  White legislators mandated a series of laws
22
 that forced black freed men  
   to become indentured servants by criminalizing them…Once in prison,  
    convicts were leased or rented for absurd fees to the private entrepreneurs.  
   (AD 9) 
Holding DuBois’s account to be accurate, Davis claims that prisons are “the persistence 
of some of the deep structures of slavery” – such as access to cheap, forced labor and 
institutionalized violence – and a non-racist U.S. prison system is an oxymoron (AD 96).   
Though Davis focuses on the connection between racial slavery and the modern 
prison system in the United States, if one looks at the operation of penitentiaries, prior to 
the Civil War, connections between criminal incarceration and slavery are more complex 
than the present-day, disproportionate representation of people of color in the criminal 
justice system.  Since Davis recognizes that our contemporary situation is different from 
that of the antebellum era, she expands the notion of race and harms of racialization so as 
to move beyond a black/white dichotomy.  She explains: 
  Although the hegemonic struggle against racism has definitely been a  
   contestation with anti-black racism, through the history of this country,  
    there have been other racialized histories and other forms of assault on  
    indigenous populations.  I think it is extremely important to acknowledge  
    the mutability of race and the alterability of the structures of racism. (AD  
   56) 
The “mutability of race” allows Davis to demonstrate that anyone can suffer at the hands 
of a racist construct like the PIC or slavery.  It permits her to show how “the workings of 
                                                 






contemporary structured racism…can injure white people as well as people of color” in 
terms of incarceration and the death penalty (AD 35).  Any person who is part of the 
economic underclass has a higher likelihood to get caught in the system. 
 
 iii. Imagination and prison abolition  
  The limitation of human imagination, according to Davis, can be seen in historical 
and contemporary behaviors, discourses, and institutions of society.  Davis critiques the 
human imagination but also claims that the imagination is the impetus for opening up the 
possibility for an alternative way of living that would not include the PIC.    
   Davis offers historic examples of how this imaginative limitation has shown itself 
in racial slavery, the abolitionist movement, and in the civil rights movement.  In terms of 
racial slavery, the limitation of human imagination created the conditions for chattel 
slavery.  The reduction of human beings to “raced” peoples, the erasure of people’s 
autonomy and dignity, and the understanding of human life as commodity were caused 
by and sustained through the limitation of the human imagination.  As for the abolitionist 
movement, in Davis’s “Introduction to the City Lights Edition of Narrative of the Life of 
Fredrick Douglass, An American Slave,” she begins with the doubt white abolitionists 
had regarding Frederick Douglass’s status as a former slave.  She explains that “white 
audiences were often so impressed by his literacy and eloquence as a speaker that they 
assumed he must have been a free black person who was formally educated” (ICL 21).  
They could not imagine the case could be otherwise.  On the issue of the civil rights 
movement, in a talk given in 2008, Davis spoke of present-day people’s collective 






that those in the United States “can’t imagine that movement could have been created by 
a huge number of people whose names we do not even know” (Ruggiero 14-5).  For 
instance, the Montgomery bus boycott “would not have been possible had it not been for 
black women domestic workers,” and “we can’t imagine that they were agents of history 
that gave us this amazing civil rights movement” (Ruggiero 15).   
  Davis’s criticism of the imagination are not only external; that is, she is not only 
critical of other individual and collective usages of the imagination.  Davis also criticizes 
her own thinking and analysis and admits to being embarrassed that her early lectures in 
the late 1960’s and early 1970’s on Fredrick Douglass “relied on an implicitly 
masculinist notion of freedom” (ICL 28).  Through a combination of the social norms and 
collective consciousness of the era and her own personal imaginative limitations, she 
failed to be more critical of the gendering of the material and her presentation of it.   
  As Davis identifies the imagination as the device for the implementation and 
continuation of uncritical ideas and language as well as acts of dehumanization, she also 
believes the imagination is the impetus for developing the possibility to transcend 
limitations; it can open paths to alternative ways of being in the world.  After Davis 
admits to her own imaginative limitation regarding Douglass, as noted above, she then 
offers a way to engage with this limitation in order to create new possibilities of 
interpretation and understanding.  In terms of Douglass’s own masculine narrative of 
“freedom” and “manhood” and his Narrative’s “abundance of images of enslaved, 
thrashed, and battered black women,” Davis believes critics should not want to exorcise 
these images – a popular contemporary approach (ICL 34-5).  Instead, “we should try to 






slavery and possible gendered strategies for freedom” (ICL 35).  As is clear, the limited 
imagination contributed to the era which Douglass lived and his own masculine-centric 
ideologies, but this limitation becomes the place of creation and possibility for Davis.  
Why not try and imagine a framework that is able to sustain multiple realities at the same 
time? Why not complicate our interpretation of the Narrative itself, slavery, and our own 
notions of gender and violence?  
   The imagination plays this type of crucial role in prison abolition.  For Davis, it is 
the limitation of the imagination preventing people from taking serious the notion of 
prison abolition.  One of the first questions which arise in the discussion of abolishing the 
prisons and jails is “what will replace them?” (APO 105).  Instead of answering with a 
determinate alternative, Davis counters with a question: “Why should it be so difficult to 
imagine alternatives to our current system of incarceration?” (APO 105).  Those who 
oppose prison abolition, or are hesitant in giving it meaningful consideration, want an 
answer to the what: what will stand in the prison’s place?  This question indicates a 
problem for Davis.  Davis says “if we focus myopically on the existing system…it is very 
hard to imagine a structurally similar system capable of handling such a vast population 
of lawbreakers” (APO 106).   
  The question, “What will replace the prisons?” indicates that one is already 
beginning from a non-imaginative orientation.  It demonstrates an inability to radically 
re-conceptualize accepted ideas about criminal behavior and punishment.  Davis claims, 
then, a need to revise existing conceptual prisms and reframe how it is we think about 
and organize our social and personal worlds.  For example, it is our limited way of 






this problem.  Davis believes that if we expand what the prison system entails then we 
would put ourselves in a better position to imagine radical alternatives – not replacements.  
“If…we shift our attention from the prison, perceived as an isolated institution, to the set 
of relationships that comprise the prison industrial complex, it may be easier to think 
about alternatives” (APO 106).  Rather than limiting the scope of what “prison system” 
means and proposing a one-to-one ratio solution – i.e. replacing the prison system with 
some other system which punitively deals with “criminals” – for Davis,  
    the first step…[is] to let go of the desire to discover one single alternative  
   system of punishment that would occupy the same footprint as the prison  
    system…An abolitionist approach…would require us to imagine a  
    constellation of alternative strategies and institutions, with the ultimate  
    aim of removing the prison from the social and ideological landscapes of  
    our society.  (APO 106, 107) 
Instead of taking on too much, Davis believes “a more complicated framework may yield 
more options than if [people] simply attempt to discover a single substitute for the prison 
system” (APO 106).  She truly does complicate the framework – speaking of economic 
exploitation in global capitalism and universal forms of racism, state-sponsored murder, 
sexual violence, religious intolerance, homophobia, military and media industrial 
complexes, and disappearing communities physically and socially through voting, 
employment and educational disenfranchisement (AD 57).   
  Though Davis offers a negative critique of the institutions and ideologies which 
comprise the PIC, she follows in the footsteps of DuBois and believes a positive aspect or 






abolished there is a danger that other systems with the same goals would arise to fill the 
void left by the abolished system” (Ben-Moshe 85).  In terms of U.S. slavery, Du Bois 
believed that “abolition [is] not…a mere negative process, one of tearing down.  It is 
ultimately about creating new institutions” (Ben-Moshe 85).  “New institutions” in this 
sense would not be replacements having the said function of confinement. 
     Just as Davis identified the imagination as the problem and solution regarding 
the broader ideologies and practices of oppression and brutality, she uses imagination as a 
casual variable when speaking of the PIC.  The lack of imagination has made 
incarceration facilities permanent fixtures of society, but human imagination opens up the 
possibility of an alternative way of living which does not need to involve incarceration 
facilities or the institutional and ideological structures that have created and sustained 
their use.  In “Race and Criminalization: Black Americans and the Punishment Industry,” 
Davis explains:  
    Raising the possibility of abolishing jails and prisons as the  
   institutionalized and normalized means of addressing social problems in  
    an era of migrating corporations, unemployment and homelessness, and  
    collapsing public services, from health care to education, can hopefully  
    help to interrupt the current law-and-order discourse that has such a grip  
    on the collective imagination, facilitated as it is by deep and hidden  
    influences of racism. (RC 72)  
The imagination allows for the conceptual expansion from the prison system to the PIC 
and also allows us to unhinge incarceration facilities from inevitability.   






academic field that goes by the name of critical prison studies” (CR 431).  Davis’s 
“ambivalen[ce] about the formation of prison studies as a field” is due to what it could 
“mean to constitute a field that foresees and, indeed, strives for its own abolition along 
with the abolition of its defining object?” (CR 431).  Despite Davis’s concerns over the 
formation of an academic field of prison studies, the creation of the academic field at the 
very least indicates a growing critical interest into a deeper engagement with the PIC.    
  In terms of prison abolition, speaking of Eric A. Stanley – the coeditor of Captive 
Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison Industrial Complex – Davis explains that 
“[h]e and other authors write about the important role that transgender politics can play in 
furthering prison abolition and, vise-versa, how prison abolition can further the cause of 
eliminating transphobia” (CR 430).  As more people begin to take the notion of prison 
abolition seriously, more and more creative analyses and poetic/experimental approaches 
will be developed.  Regarding the writings about transgender politics and prison abolition, 
Davis says, “Twenty years ago, it would have been impossible to imagine such an 
approach” (CR 430).  Now such an approach has become possible because the human 
imagination went beyond the cognitive limitations which closed off certain possibilities. 
    
iv. Abolition democracy: positive aspect of prison abolition 
  For Davis, contemporary United States is a capitalist democracy.  It is not only 
  … fundamentally distorted by the market and by the industrial/commercial  
   system but…it is also racist, patriarchal and, an associated  
   characteristic, arbitrarily violent, a combination in which each infects and  






Davis’s prison abolitionism seeks to untangle the notions of capitalism and democracy 
from each other.  Ultimately, Davis finds value in democracy as a way for organizing 
society, but instead of a capitalist democracy, Davis argues for an abolition democracy.     
 An abolition democracy is as close to egalitarian as possible.  And here, again, we 
see Davis returning to DuBois.  He used the term “abolition democracy” in Black 
Reconstruction to refer to the “host of democratic institutions…needed to fully achieve 
abolition” (AD 96).  For DuBois, the legal abolition of slavery in the United States was 
accomplished only in the negative sense.  Though certain practices of racial, chattel 
slavery were rendered illegal, the exploitation of black people and the practices which 
kept a disproportionate number of black people from economic independence and social 
mobility continued.  According to DuBois:  
  New institutions should have been created to incorporate black people into  
    the social order…[S]lavery could not be truly abolished until people were  
    provided with the economic means for their subsistence. (AD 95)   
Davis uses this formulation when thinking about prison abolition.  She says that “new 
institutions and resources [must be] made available to those communities that provide, in 
large part, the human beings that make up the prison population” (AD 97).  Instead of 
simply freeing all incarcerated peoples as a means for abolishing prisons, Davis argues 
that more individual and community resources are needed in order to stop the supply of 
people who populate the prisons.  Clearly, thinking about prison abolition in these terms 
means it is not a matter of “wielding axes and literally hacking at prison walls” (AD 76).  
Thus, Davis believes that people thinking poetically about the supposed necessity of 






begin to solve the social problems that set people on the track to prison thereby helping to 
render the prison obsolete” (AD 96).  The proposal of and struggle for implementing such 
a sweeping set of social institutions would indicate the transformation from a capitalist 







CHAPTER 3. GIORGIO AGAMBEN AND THE COMING COMMUNITY   
i.  Introduction  
  In order to understand the complexities and implications of Giorgio Agamben’s 
The Coming Community,
23
 and eventually how it advances Davis’s prison abolitionism, it 
is important to note the conversation Agamben is entering in this book.  Leland de la 
Durantaye in Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction explains that one dominant 
discussion Agamben engages is the “communal conceptions and experiences of Georges 
Bataille”24 which, prior to the publication of The Coming Community, Jean-Luc Nancy 
and Maurice Blanchot were debating (157).
 25
 “It is against the backdrop formed by this 
debate that Agamben published his less despondently titled The Coming Community” (de 
la Durantaye 159).  The specifics of the Nancy and Blanchot debate about Bataille far 
exceed the project at hand, but generally speaking, these thinkers (Agamben included) are 
attempting to think through the issues of belonging – of inclusion and exclusion – that 
arise in philosophic investigations of community.  As de la Durantaye summarizes:
                                                 
23 Original Italian edition published in 1990; English edition was published in 1993. 
24 In Georges Bataille: The Sacred and Society, William Pawlett describes Bataille as seeking “a powerful 
sense of community, one that could not be reduced to notions of culture, identity or ‘thingness,’” and the 
“recognition of the radical ‘insufficiency’ of the individual is the vital condition for intense communication 
between beings that would build the spirit of community” (xix). 
25 These publications include: Jean-Luc Nancy’s article “The Inoperative Community” (1983), Maurice 







     communities have always had criteria for belonging and have always  
   organized themselves around these criteria – whether national,     
  geographical, racial, religious, or other.  Even when the conditions of  
    belonging have been liberally formulated and flexibly interpreted, the  
    result has nonetheless routinely involved exclusion and isolation, and  
    sooner or later the purity of identity and the protection of real or symbolic  
    resources has become a subject of violent contention.  (159) 
The problem is: the method utilized most often for undermining the “violent contention” 
caused by the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy is to redefine the criteria for inclusion. This 
approach, however, does not eradicate the “violent contention;” that is, the revision of 
who counts as included does not simultaneously eliminate exclusion altogether.  Though 
such a process is sometimes done under the guise of eliminating the brutalized or 
oppressed status excluded individuals or groups experience, the “new” inclusive identity 
both values a set of criteria and, whether intentionally or not, vilifies a set criteria which 
is defined as not like it.  Thus, the predominate means of undermining oppressive realities 
experienced by those who are excluded from full access and use of “real or symbolic 
resources” – using a different or modified list of characteristics to define the inclusive 
group – still dichotomizes people into included/excluded groups, and the process to 
overcome the problem begins again.   
  Agamben attempts to resolve the inclusion/exclusion problem in The Coming 
Community by “formulat[ing] an idea of community that would be immune to hostile 






Agamben does so by way of re-interpreting the history of (Western) philosophy’s 
understanding of ontology via impotentiality.   
 
ii. Foundation: Aristotle and impotentiality 
   Agamben draws upon Aristotle’s notion of existing/effective potentiality to orient 
his ontology of impotentiality, which informs what he means by “a community without 
criteria for belonging” (de la Durantaye 160).  In the essay, “On Potentiality,”26 Agamben 
says, “In both his metaphysics and his physics, Aristotle opposed potentiality to actuality, 
dynamis to energeia” (177).  But Aristotle also claims there are two modes of potentiality 
(dynamis): generic potentiality and existing/effective potentiality (P 179).  This means, as 
de la Durantaye specifies, “the relation of potentiality to actuality can be articulated in 
two modes” (5).  Generic potentiality and existing/effective potentiality are distinguished 
by Aristotle on the basis of how each potentiality relates to actuality.      
  Generic potentiality for Aristotle is the “easiest to grasp: the potentiality to be.  
For a thing to be, it stands to reason that it must have first been possible (for if it had been 
impossible it could never have come to be)” (de la Durantaye 5).  According to Aristotle, 
generic potentiality operates via possibility; that is, the relation between potentiality and 
actuality expressed in the mode of generic potentiality is characterized by possibility, and 
possibility is understood through change.  In “Capacity and Potentiality: Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics Ɵ. 6-7 from the Perspective of De Anima,” Thomas K. Johansen says 
change in this sense refers to the “capab[ility] of initiating or undergoing a change” (209).  
When Aristotle speaks of change, he has something particular in mind.  Change refers to 
                                                 






changes in/of attributes (or “ordinary changes” as Johansen calls them); “change involves 
the replacement of an attribute by its opposite” (Johansen 213).  For instance, light 
turning to its opposite dark or big shrinking to its opposite small.   
  According to Aristotle, generic potentiality is a particular mode of potentiality 
that expresses the relation between potentiality and actuality in terms of possibility.  
Agamben cites Aristotle’s example: “a child can potentially become the head of State” (P 
179).  The child can possibly become the head of State.  The change here is the 
transformation of a child into a head of State.  As Tyson E. Lewis explains: “a generic 
conceptualization of potentiality explains how a child is able to grow up to be a particular 
type of person with a particular occupation” (587).  This mode of potentiality depends 
upon “fully actual[izing] this potential” (Lewis 588).  That is, it can be said that the child 
has the potential to become head of State when the child actualizes/realizes this potential.  
We know the child had the potential to become the head of State because that is in fact 
what the child became.  Therefore, generic potentiality is completely determined by 
actuality.  
   In this schema, potentiality…becomes subordinate to actuality – it is in  
   some sense what makes the actual possible but also what must be  
    eliminated in order for the passage to the act to be complete and thus for  
    the subject to rightfully take his or her place within the allotted order of  
   things. (Lewis 588) 
Generic potentiality is fully realized, or known, only after the fact of actualization when 






  The other mode of potentiality which Aristotle refers is existing/effective 
potentiality.  Agamben uses passages in his essay “On Potentiality” from Aristotle’s 
Book Theta of Metaphysics to highlight Aristotle’s purpose for distinguishing this 
particular mode of potentiality.  Jessica Whyte in Catastrophe and Redemption: The 
Political Thought of Giorgio Agamben summarizes:  
    Aristotle suggests that to ensure the independent existence of potentiality,  
   and prevent it passing immediately into actuality, all potentiality much  
    also be potentiality not to (adynamia).  “What is potential,” Aristotle  
    writes, “can both be and not be, for the same is potential to be and not to  
    be.” (C 106)  
On Agamben’s account, Aristotle believed that impotentiality (adynamia) – the potential 
to not be – belongs to all potentiality (dynamia) and uses this to maintain a mode of 
potentiality that is not subordinate to actuality.  Existing/effective potentiality has a non-
binding relationship with actuality.  “The key figure of potentiality,” Agamben says, is 
“the mode of its existence as potentiality” (P 179).  Potentiality, as potentiality, exists and 
sustains itself through impotentiality.  The “‘potentiality to not-be,’ or ‘impotence,’ is not 
to be understood as…an actual weakness or incapacity, for the reason that it is not to be 
understood in the context of actuality at all” (de la Durantaye 5).   
  The second mode of potentiality, existing/effective potentiality, can be best 
highlighted in terms of knowledge.  According to Aristotle, knowledge in general is 
“already possessed in potentiality or capacity in virtue of being a human being” 
(Johansen 213).  Humans can have knowledge or abilities independent of whether they 






and poet to show what is meant by existing/effective potentiality.  He says, “someone 
[already]… has knowledge or an ability” – the architect “has the potential to build” and 
the poet “the potential to write poems” (P 179).  Existing/effective potentiality is 
potential “on the basis of which [one] can also not bring [one’s] knowledge into actuality 
(mē energein) by not making a work, for example” (P 179).  In The Coming Community, 
Agamben uses Herman Melville’s character Bartleby as an exemplar figure in this regard.  
“Bartleby [is] a scribe who does not simply cease writing but ‘prefers not to’” (CC 37).  
Bartleby has (possesses) the potential to write but chooses not to actualize this potential.  
Existing/effective potentiality “is not…the potential to do this or that thing, but potential 
to not-do, potential not to pass into actuality” (P 180).   
  Though there is an absence of actualizing the potential knowledge and/or ability, 
existing/effective potentiality is not a pure absence.  “[P]otentiality is not simply non-
Being, simple privation, but rather the existence of non-Being, the presence of an absence” 
(P 179).  Since existing/effective potentiality is not subordinate to actuality, it preserves 
its own existence as potentiality.  Consequently,   
    [c]ontrary to the traditional idea of potentiality that is annulled in actuality,  
   here we are confronted with a potentiality that conserves itself and saves  
    itself in actuality. Here potentiality, so to speak, survives actuality and, in  
    this way, gives itself to itself.  (P 184)  
It is impotence or impotentiality – the potential not-to – as it belongs to all potentiality 
that allows the mode of existing/effective potentiality to “survive actuality.”  Whyte uses 
the terms “complete potentiality” and “perfect potentiality” to reference existing/effective 






withdrawing from it, and so ‘maintains itself in relation to the act in the form of its own 
suspension’” (C 106).  Said another way, de la Durantaye explains that impotentiality 
“denotes the possibility for a thing not to pass into existence and thereby remain at the 
level of mere – or ‘pure’ – potentiality” (5). Crucial for the following discussion of The 
Coming Community is “the view that potentiality must ‘constitutively be the potentiality 
not to,’” and this “provides the ontological underpinning” in The Coming Community (C 
106).  
    
iii.  Coming community 
iii.a.  Whatever being: overview 
   Agamben focuses upon the aspect of the to “not-be” contained in Aristotle’s 
second mode of potentiality (existing/effective potentiality) as an opening for rethinking 
Western discourse about ontology and the history of Western philosophy.  In Agamben 
and Theology, Colby Dickinson explains: 
  In essence, and as will determine Agamben’s fundamental rethinking of  
    Western ontology in its entirety, the ‘division of division’ itself ultimately  
    indicates that the representations we depend so much upon for the  
    comprehension of our world are ‘not all’ there is to reality. (90)  
According to Agamben, the constant presence of an absence, the impotence, has been 
passed over, forgotten, or misunderstood.  It is with this impotentiality Agamben is able 
to think through the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy of community and the “violent 
contention” associated with it.  “The binaries (dichotomies) which govern Western 






their metaphysical foundations” (Dickinson 99).  Understanding ontology through 
impotentiality renders the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy inoperable for Agamben and 
thus the “violent contention” associated with community/community formation 
disappears.  
  An ontology of impotentiality Agamben terms whatever in The Coming 
Community.  For Agamben, whatever does not carry the tone of indifference it has in 
more recent usages.  Whatever – the term quodlibet – is not “‘being, it does not matter 
which’ but rather ‘being such that it always matters’” (CC 1).  Being whatever thus 
amounts to a special or exemplary singularity; it always matters.  The indifference 
accompanying whatever is that of concerned indifference .  As Agamben explains:  
    The Whatever in question here relates to singularity not in its indifference  
    with respect to a common property (to a concept, for example: being red,  
    being French, being Muslim), but on in its being such as it is. (CC 1)   
Whatever is not singular due to concerned indifference with respect to an identification or 
property (actualization).  William Watkin in Agamben and Indifference says, “Whatever-
being here is indifference not because difference is suspended but because being as-such 
is foregrounded and put in play by indifference” (67).  Being whatever is special or 
singular because it is what it is.  The radical consequence of the concerned indifference of 
whatever being in terms of inclusion or belonging is:          
    such-and-such being is reclaimed from its having this or that property,  
     which identifies it as belonging to this or that set, to this or that class (the  






    nor for the simple generic absence of any belonging, but for its being- 
    such, for belonging itself. (CC 1-2) 
The influence of Aristotle’s distinction between generic potentiality and 
existing/effective potentiality is clear.  In terms of generic potentiality, potentiality is 
apprehended via the possibility of a change of properties.  On the other hand, just as 
existing/effective potentiality is not subordinate to actuality (actual properties), whatever 
being is not subordinate to actual properties.   
    If potentiality passed immediately into the act, then each act would be  
   necessary.  Humans could therefore be defined by vocation, a fact, a  
    biology that was our destiny…[H]umans, Agamben argues, are also  
   capable of our own impotentiality, which ensures that we are capable of  
    being other that what we are – that we are beings of pure potentiality,  
    irreducible to biology, identity, or vocation. (C 110) 
Being whatever is being as-such.  Whatever being indicates an ontology that is pure 
belonging – belonging itself – not an ontology based upon belonging to this or that 
identity or group. In Agamben and Politics: A Critical Introduction, Segi Prozorov 
describes whatever as “a being that appears solely in its existing, subtracted from all its 
positive predicates, be they gender, colour, profession, political or sexual preferences” 
(77). A thing is what it is such as it is.    
    
iii.b.  Whatever being: Irreparable 
    Agamben ends The Coming Community with an Appendix titled “The Irreparable.”  






chapters or “fragments” can be understood “as a commentary on section 9 of Martin 
Heidegger’s Being and Time and proposition 6.44 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus” 
(CC 89).  Section 9 of Being and Time addresses the who-ness of Dasein
27
 as 
differentiated from a present-at-hand what-ness.  6.44 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus reads: 
Nicht wie die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondem dass sie ist [Not how the world is, is the 
mystical, but that it is.]  According to Agamben, “[b]oth texts deal with the attempt to 
define an old problem of metaphysics: the relationship between essence and existence, 
between quid est and quod est” (CC 89).  In other words, The Coming Community is a 
meditation on the relationship between essence and existence, and hence, the 
“fragments…will be clear only if one can situate them in this context” (CC 89).  It is only 
after the reader has read the previous chapters, or fragments, that we are given the 
inspiration or context with which to understand The Coming Community.    
  The Heidegger and Wittgenstein references both address the sheer facticity of 
Being.  Heidegger in Being and Time attempted to ground Dasein ontologically.  Dasein 
is a being for who Being is an issue.  Dasein is an agent that can interrogate what Being 
means and therefore, for Heidegger, has access to the disclosure of Being itself; Dasein 
can move beyond conflating Being with a being.  Similarly, Wittgenstein, in the passage 
noted by Agamben, is commenting that it is not how beings exist but that there is existing 
at all which is “mystical.” 
  Like Heidegger, Agamben believes that the history of Western philosophy has 
dealt with the question of Being as if it were a being.  In Being and Time, Heidegger says, 
“The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity” (BT 26, H 6).  For Heidegger, the question 
                                                 






of the meaning of Being requires a methodology – phenomenological analysis – as a 
means of uncovering the meaning of Being.  Of course, as indicated by the term 
phenomenology, the meaning of Being is uncovered by looking at phenomena, and for 
Heidegger, the particular phenomenon he uses for his investigation is Dasein – the being 
which can ask the question about the meaning of Being. 
 Agamben in The Coming Community does not follow the specific trajectory of 
Heidegger regarding an investigation of Dasein, but the influence cannot be denied.   
    “[W]hatever beings” do not discard or destroy their positive predicates,  
   just as the ecstatic character of the existence of Dasein in Heidegger  
   consists in “exiting” from itself without “abandoning” itself. (Prozorov 77)  
With the concept Irreparable, Agamben is trying to conceptualize whatever being – the 
fact that there is as opposed to how beings exist.  Heidegger states, “Being lies in the fact 
that something is, and in its Being as it is” (BT 26, H 7).  The Irreparable means without 
remedy or without repair; it is as it is.   
    The Irreparable is that things are just as they are, in this or that mode,  
   consigned without remedy to their way of being.  States of things are  
   irreparable, whatever they may be: sad or happy, atrocious or blessed.   
    How you are, how the world is – this is the Irreparable. (CC 90) 
Entities are, I am, and the world is, as Agamben states, irreparable; just as they are. 
 Agamben sees the Irreparable as a way to destabilizes the “old problem of 
metaphysics” – of the relation between essence and existence (CC 89).  Whatever being 
as Irreparable means Being is not predetermined.  Entities do not have to be this or that 






should.  Irreparable does not assume a prior-to-existence essence or prescription.  At the 
same time, the Irreparable is also not an existence – a predicate actuality.  As Agamben 
asserts:  
     The Irreparable is neither an essence nor an existence, neither or a  
   substance nor a quality, neither a possibility nor a necessity.  It is not  
   properly a modality of being, but it is the being that is already given in  
    modality, that is its modalities.  It is not thus, but rather it is its thus. (CC  
   92)   
Being whatever is Irreparable but not in the way something exists (i.e. “a modality of 
being”).  The Irreparable of Being is always “already given” in modality; it is the is-ness 
(or the more action orientated is-ing) of its modalities.   
 
iii.c. Whatever being: Thus 
.    In section II of the Appendix, Agamben elucidates the thus mentioned at the end 
of section I.    
   Being thus is not a substance of which thus would express a determination  
    or a qualification.  Being is not a presupposition that is before or after its  
   qualities. Being that is irreparably thus is its thus; it is only its mode of  
   being.  (The thus is not an essence that determines an existence, but it  
    finds its essence in its own being-thus, in its being its own determination.)   
   (CC 93) 
Through this obscure passage, Agamben is furthering his discussion about the misguided 






dichotomy.  Watkin depicts Agamben’s thus in the following way:     
    Thus-ness therefore is not an abstract quality that links all species of  
   being, that is, every being, to a general genus Being, namely, what  
    possesses quiddity, but is always a specific what-ness, that which saves  
    particularity and generality from their traditional paradoxical relationship  
    by the insistence of a disseminating singularity… (96) 
Two critical points need to be made here.  First, being-thus is not a general what-ness that 
all entities share.  “Since, in Kant’s famous expression, ‘being is not a real 
predicate,’…the subtraction of a being from all real predicates leaves it with nothing but 
its being itself, the sheer facticity of its existence” (Prozorov 77).  Thus-ness is not the 
quality which places all entities in the category (or genus) Being.  “[B]eing-thus is not 
simply that it is but also that it is something in its singularity” (Watkin 96).  Second, the 
singularity of the thus is not singular in the sense that it is defined against or in opposition 
to all other entities.   
 Agamben classifies that the term “thus” is an anaphora – a word used as a 
substitute for a preceding word or group of words.  Therefore, “only through this 
preceding term does it [the thus] (which, in itself, has no meaning) identify its proper 
referent” (CC 94).  The thus in Being-thus operates unconventionally. Since Agamben is 
trying to destabilize the “old problem of metaphysics” of the relationship between 
essence and existence, Agamben claims that “we have to conceive of an anaphora that no 
longer refers back to any meaning or any referent, an absolute thus that does not 
presuppose anything, that is completely exposed” (CC 94).  Exposure, a showing, is an 






hence a predicate identity, the thus of Being-thus is complete exposure and therefore 
abandoned.
28
  “The general features of any given being are…prominently, though 
precariously, on display to the world, ‘exposed,’ as [Agamben] will term it, to every other 
being” (Dickinson 101).    
  I am thus, the world is thus, you are thus; I, world, you, each is “such as it is” (CC 
93).  In other words, I, you, world are not otherwise.  For Agamben, “not otherwise 
negates each predicate as a property (on the plane of essence), but takes them up again as 
im-proprieties or improprieties (on the plan of existence)” (CC 93-4).  Being whatever is 
an irreparable singularity for Agamben.  “Singularity here can be taken to mean lacking 
particularity and yet not being subsumed under another one-identity” (Watkin 68).  
Singularity is not a particular identity nor is its being analogous to the being just like 
everything else. 
 
iii.d.  Whatever being: outside as transitional space 
  In the chapter “Outside,” Agamben attempts to describe how pure exposure is the 
singularity of being Whatever.  Rather than an ontology determined by identity – a 
belonging to this or that group – whatever singularity is “determined only through its 
relation to…the totality of its possibilities” (CC 67).  And, according to Agamben, it is 
    …[t]hrough this relationship, as Kant said, singularity borders all  
    possibility and thus receives its omnimoda determinatio not from its  
    participation in a determinate concept or some actual property (being red,  
    Italian, Communist), but only by means of this bordering (CC 67).   
                                                 






For Agamben, a border is not an absolute, impermeable limit that demarcates an inside 
from an outside.  It is “a threshold (Grenze), that is, a point of contact with an external 
space that remains empty” (CC 67).  To be in relation to the totality of possibilities means 
whatever singularity is “…the relation to an empty and indeterminate totality” (CC 67).     
  Being whatever is not being this or that for which all things this are not like that.  
Whatever being is Being-thus recalling that thus is anaphora that does not refer back to 
any referent.  Being whatever is the taking-place of the border but a border which is 
exposed to the totality of possibilities.  
   As Agamben often does, he gives an etymological reading for drawing this 
conclusion.  “[T]he notion of the ‘outside’ is expressed in many European languages by a 
word that means ‘at the door’ (fores in Latin is the door of the house, thyrathen in Greek 
literally means ‘at the threshold’” (CC 68).  The Latin word fores and Greek word 
thyrathen are cognates of the Sanskrit dvār; these words share the same Indo-European 
root *dhwer.  The napumsaka linga (neuter noun) dvāra means door, gate, passage, 
entrance, opening, aperture (of the human body), and medium.  The Sanskrit word 
reinforces the point that Agamben is making about what outside means.  It is not 
something independent and removed from the inside.  “The outside is not another space, 
but rather, it is the passage, the exteriority that gives it access – in a word, it is its face, its 
eidos” (CC 68).29  
  The relation between “outside” and “face” is one which Agamben makes 
throughout The Coming Community.  The face is another way for Agamben to convey the 
                                                 
29 Thomas Wall compares Agamben’s use of the “face” with Immanuel Levinas’s central notion of the 






idea of bordering’s exteriority – of exposure.  The relation between “outside” and “face” 
via the threshold or door is explicitly present in the Bhagavad Gītā in the usage of dvār.  
Various forms of the word occur in six passages.  Three out of these six passages use the 
word dvār in context to the human body.  The first of these happens in “Book V: The 
Yoga of Renunciation” śloka thirteen: 
    sarvakarmāni manasā 
   samnyasyāste sukham vaśī  | 
    navadvāre pure dehī 
    naiva karvan na kārayan  || 
 
    Having renounced all actions with the mind,  
    the embodied one, as ruler, sits  
    happily in the city of nine gates –  
    indeed not acting nor causing to act (causing action).
30
 
The form of dvār used here is dvāre, the pumlinga (masculine), saptamī (locative), 
ekavacana (singular) form that very basically translates to mean in, on, or at the gate/door.  
The term nine (nava) modifies or accompanies the word dvāre.  As Winthrop Sargeant 
footnotes in his translation of Bhagavad Gītā for this passage: “The ‘city’ is the body.  
The ‘nine gates’ are the two eyes, the two ears, the two nostrils, the mouth and the organs 
of excretion and generation” (BG 255).  Significant for our purposes, is as mentioned, the 
connection between “outside” and “face” in Agamben.  That which is outside – according 
                                                 






to Agamben – is not wholly beyond and separate from the inside.  Outside is a threshold 
or a passageway – never a static space that occurs beyond an absolute limit.  Agamben 
poetically refers to this border, this threshold, as the face; it is pure exteriority or 
exposure – “‘showing’ itself as a singularity” (Dickinson 101). 
     
iii.e. Whatever being: community 
  Whatever being is not something reducible to empirical/corporeal properties 
which generally determine it as a kind (essence) of a thing.  Recall in the “Introduction” 
to this chapter the discussion about inclusion/exclusion.  An attempt to revise the 
dynamics of inclusion/exclusion of community is done so via a redefinition or 
modification upon the predicate criteria of what constitutes the included and excluded 
groups.  However, the violent contention accompanying the inclusion/exclusion 
dichotomy does not cease but rather continues with this method.  For Agamben, what 
replaces this traditional means of classification of kinds in relation to properties is not 
another property/kind classificatory scheme nor is it nihilism where the thing does not 
belong to anything at all.  Agamben is trying to render the problem associated with 
inclusion/exclusion of community inoperative through proposing an ontology of 
whatever being.   
   Commonly, a perceived community or group exists by virtue of a property or set 
of properties which is found among the individual entities that populate the group.  
Inclusion depends upon discrimination (i.e. discerning this from that) in two respects: 1) 
it presupposes the identification of a discernable property or properties and 2) 






or properties. At every step of the way, beginning with language, inclusion depends upon 
discrimination and thus exclusion. 
  Agamben undermines this entire process of continual inclusion/exclusion by 
demonstrating the ontology of the coming community is whatever being.  This means 
belonging itself “not by any condition of belonging (being red, being Italian, being 
Communist)” (CC 85).  All national, racial, gendered, linguistic, ethnic, class, or political 
party predicates are not the impetus for the coming community.  At the same time, 
Agamben is not proposing the dissolution of predicate criteria.  The coming community 
is not grounded “by the simple absence of conditions (a negative community, such as that 
recently proposed in France by Maurice Blanchot)” (CC 85).   
 The shift in Agamben regarding identity is not one towards absolute nihilism but 
does require a revised understanding and us of individual-community identity.  Jessica 
Whyte in “‘A New Use of the Self’: Giorgio Agamben on the Coming Community” says 
the individual would no longer be “an instance of a particular identity” (2).  Therefore, 
the coming community implies “a new use of the self…[that] entail[s] the 
denaturalization and desacrilization of the self” (Whyte 2).  This is another area that non-
Western texts and traditions, including the Bhagavad Gītā, can inform the transformation 
of conceptions of individuality and/or self.  One example occurs in Book Two, śloka 
seventy-one:  
  vihāya kāmān yaḥ sarvān 
  pumāṅścarati niḥspṛhaḥ  | 
  nirmano nirahaṁkāraḥ 







   The man who abandons all desires 
   acts free from longing. 
   Indifferent to “mine-ness,” free from egotism, 
   he attains peace.
31
 
The passage speaks to the abandoning the sense of I, which is understood through the act 
of possession.  The term ahaṃkāra is the “cognitive faculty of ego-consciousness” and 
comes from the Sāṃkhya tradition (Malinar 78).  The function of the ahaṃkāra is   
    attachment to the sense objects and appropriation of the world by relating  
   to it through the word ‘I’.  As a consequence, it is held that renouncing all  
   desires means to rid oneself of ‘egotism’ (nirahaṃkāra) and  
   possessiveness (nirmama).  This results in a ‘brahman-like’ condition,  
   which means that all attachment is gone and an impersonal state of being  
   has been obtained. (Malinar 78) 
Rather than equating identity with predicate criteria (“sense objects”/“appropriation of 
the world”), Agamben wants to undermine this sense of self-community.  Human 
ontology is one of impotentiality; we cannot be attached or dependent upon identity.  
Predicate characteristics do not vanish. Whatever beings “retain their predicates, [but] 
they are no longer definable through them” (Prozorov 77).  Dickenson puts it the 
following way: “In effect…‘whatever beings’ hold open the empty place of identity 
without yet constituting one as such according to a reductionistic logic of exclusion” 
(101).  
                                                 






iv.  Identity: Agamben and Davis 
 One very clear area that Davis and Agamben inform one another is in terms of 
identity.  Both challenge us to unhinge political and social identities from the notion of 
essence.  In “Coalition Building among People of Color: A Discussion with Angela Y. 
Davis and Elizabeth Martinez,” Davis says “it is more productive…not to adhere to rigid 
categories, to the idea that there is something called ‘African-American woman-ness,’ 
some essence of what constitutes ‘African-American woman’” (304).  This sentiment, the 
essentializing of identity based upon predicate characteristics is exactly what Agamben is 
(in part) challenging in The Coming Community.  When such identities are thought of as 
being essential, energy is spend defining and making rigid those identities.  Instead, 
Davis believes it is “important to fight on and not about political terms” (CB 304).  Use 
the identity – whatever it is – as the ground for which to situate the discussion toward 
larger social justice issues.      
  Davis unequivocally thinks that identity is an ineffective way to organize 
communities of struggle.
32
  In Abolition Democracy, Davis explains:  
    Identity, by itself, has never been an adequate criterion around which  
   communities of struggle could be organized – not even during those  
   periods when we imagined identity as the most powerful engine of  
    movements…Even during the period when black unity was assumed to be  
    the sin qua non of struggle, it was more a fiction than anything else.  The  
    class, gender, and sexual fissures that lurked just beneath the construction  
                                                 
32 Communities of struggle, resistance, and approaches to political goals (by Davis and Agamben) will be 






    of unity eventually exposed there and other heterogeneities that made  
    ‘unity’ an impossible dream. (100-1) 
Rather than using identity to be the site around which to build communities of struggle, 
Davis proposes the use of political goals.  She claims it would be “futile to try and create 
a single black community today.  But it does make sense to think about organizing 
communities, not simply around their blackness, but primarily around political goals” 
(AD 101).  Agamben proposes we recognize our ontological condition, whatever being – 
being as-such, not being this or that.  Identity is not erased; predicate characteristics do 
not simply disappear.  They are no longer essential attributes to categorize and fix our 






CHAPTER 4. TIME AND LIBERATION 
Part I: Temporality 
i.  Introduction  
 The purpose of this chapter is to compare the explicit and implicit temporal 
structures of Agamben’s coming community and Davis’s prison abolition.  When – 
temporally – does prison abolition and the coming community occur?  When – at what 
time – is liberation achieved, if ever?  Moreover, what alterations to our classification and 
thinking about time are needed to recognize these liberatory existences?   
  I will demonstrate that Agamben’s rendering of ontology in terms of 
impotentiality and indifference, when put in dialogue with Davis, exposes latent and 
unexplored philosophic suggestions Davis is making – specifically that the operation of 
liberation is best understood as indefinite rather than finite and attainable. Ultimately, the 
poetic re-thinking Agamben applies to ontology, temporality, and its political 
consequences serve as examples of the kinds of cognitive re-orientations vital for the 
prison abolitionist project: abolishing the conditions which allow for the prison industrial 
complex to be an unquestioned, inevitable part of social reality.  
   







  Agamben and Davis first complicate the colloquial discourse and understanding 
of time in their outlines of the coming community and prison abolition respectively.  Both 
confuse the relationship between occurrence and linear temporality, and this posture 
ultimately influences the function of determinacy and achievement of liberation.  More 
specifically, Agamben and Davis speak as if these notions (i.e. coming community and 
prison abolition) are not things that will occur in the future but already exist now – in the 
present – and extend indefinitely into the future.   
 
ii.  Time 
 Before examining the specifics of how temporality operates in Agamben and 
Davis, some opening remarks about time are needed to ground this discussion.  The 
concept of time is a highly complex and contested notion.  Time has a litany of 
definitions and associations which vary across disciplines and cultures.  How time is 
expressed in language via linguistic structures also varies among language groups.  For 
example, how would English speakers lived experience change if we had no past tense?  
The ontological and structural questions of time are fundamental to discussions in 
theology, psychology, philosophy, and physics.  The normative, everyday concept of time 
is generally described as passing.  In Time and Space, Barry Dainton explains that “what 
we mean when we say that time passes, the following formulation encapsulates the 
essentials: What is future will become present; what is present will become past; what is 
past was once present” (7).  For example, the Haitian slave revolt, from a contemporary 
perspective, is an event in the past.  During the actual revolt, the event was considered 






become present and then recede into the past.  This process is often called ‘temporal 
passage’” (Dainton 7).  For our purpose, the following discussion of Agamben and Davis 
will describe how each thinker deviates from the normative concept of time as temporal 
passage.    
   
iii.  Time of liberation 
iii.a. Agamben: archaeology/genealogy of Western conceptions of time 
  Agamben gives a genealogy of the Western conceptions of time in his essay 
“Time and History: Critique of the Instant and the Continuum” in Infancy and History: 
On the Destruction of Experience.  This essay helps explain the implicit critique of time 
that the temporal underpinnings of prison abolition addresses but it will also speak to the 
importance of temporality in relation to theories of political and social change.  Agamben 
traces some predominant themes and interpretations of time within the Western cannon, 
which has contributed to our modern experience of time.  For Agamben, “[s]ince the 
human mind has the experience of time but not its representation, it necessarily pictures 
time by means of spatial images” (IH 100).  It is through these spatial representations that 
Agamben is able to locate features of time that characterizes certain dominant ideologies 
crucial for understanding how the (Western’s) current experience of time developed via 
the Greeks, Christianity, and secularization/modernization.    
  Agamben claims that the dominant image-concept of time in the Graeco-Roman 
period is “basically circular and continuous” (IH 100).  Whether with reference to “the 






those of all other things that have natural movement’” as in Aristotle, (Western) 
Antiquity can be said to see or think of time as a circle (IH 100).   
  Time may have been spatially represented as circular for the Greeks, but it is not 
the case that through the experience of natural change and human events, there was no 
sense of a before and after.  If time was only and absolutely circular, then the experiences 
of beginning, middle, and end, would be unintelligible. Properly speaking, it would be 
impossible, according to Aristotle, “to say whether we are before or after the Trojan War” 
(IH 101).  In order to account for this, Aristotle quantified time.  As Agamben explains, 
“Aristotle thus defines time as ‘quantity of movement according to the before and after,’ 
and its continuity is assured by its division into discrete instants…analogous to the 
geometric point” (IH 101).  The instant, or the now, paradoxically divides and creates 
continuity.  “The instant in itself is nothing more than the continuity of time…a pure limit 
which both joins and divides past and future” (IH 101).  With the Greeks, then, the notion 
of the now-instant being a now-point which is continually passing is introduced.  “[T]he 
fundamental character of the Greek experience of time – which, through Aristotle’s 
Physics, has for two millennia determined the Western representation of time – is its 
being a precise, infinite, quantified continuum” (IH 101).  Not only does the Greek 
conception of time, according to Agamben, include the notion of these “precise fleeting 
instants” but also that “[t]ime is something objective and natural, which envelops things 
that are ‘inside’ it as if in a sheath…as each thing inhabits a place, so it inhabits time” (IH 
102).    
   After the Greeks, the next predominant image-concept of time is the Christian 






the image guiding the Christian conceptualization of it is a straight line” (IH 103).  The 
image of the straight line aligns with the Christian narrative and meaning of human 
existence – having a specific start (i.e. God’s creation) and a specific end (i.e. God’s final 
judgment).  The change from the circle to the straight line demonstrates a change in the 
directionality of time.   
    [I]n contrast with the directionless time of the classical world, [Christian]  
   time has a direction and a purpose: it develops irreversibly from the  
    Creation to the end, and has a central point of reference in the incarnation  
    of Christ, which shapes its development of a progression from the initial  
    fall to the final redemption. (IH 103) 
The Christian worldview posits time as trajectory; it is moving in a linear fashion from 
creation to redemption.  On this account, the purpose or goal is the final redemption.  
Since it is linear, every moment which passes is a moment further from creation and the 
fall and closer to redemption; therefore, a sense of progress – or teleology – is introduced.    
 The Christian conception of time takes the nature-inspired (external) time of the 
Greeks and places the experience of time within humans and human history – spiritually 
understood.  Agamben says that “Christianity resolutely separates time from the natural 
movement of the stars to make it an essentially human, interior phenomenon” (IH 104).  
Given what humans are considered to be according to Christianity – that is, creations of 
God endowed with a divine spark or soul meant to reside with the creator after the death 
of the body – it is understandable how time becomes something that does not encompass 
natural phenomena and movements but rather is internal to human beings and human 






the Christian conception of time is “the continuous succession of precise instants of 
Greek thought” (IH 104).33  The present is considered to be an instant or point that 
separates that past from the future. 
   The shift from the Christian representation of time to what Agamben calls the 
modern representation of time is small but significant.  Whereas the change from 
Antiquity to the Christian spatial representation of time was a change from the circle to 
the straight line, the modern representation still remains as a straight line (or “rectilinear”) 
but is secularized; it is “sundered from an notion of end and emptied of any other 
meaning but that of a structured process in terms of before and after” (IH 105).  This 
experience of time “derives from the experience of manufacturing work and is sanctioned 
by modern mechanics” (IH 105).  The repetitive motion associated with industrial work – 
both the motion of the machines and that of the human workers (i.e. the repetition of 
beginning of task to end of task to beginning again ad infinitum) – is not an indication of 
“circular motion” for Agamben; it is an indication of “uniform rectilinear motion” (IH 
105).  Again, the modern notion of time re-establishes Antiquity’s continuous, infinite 
notion of time, but rather than picturing it as a circle, it sees it as an endless straight line.  
From the prospective of the modern concept of time “a semblance of meaning can be 
saved only by introducing the idea – albeit on lacking any rational foundation – of a 
continuous, infinite progress” (IH 106). The modern conception of time does hold onto 
the sense of progress, which was a defining feature of Agamben’s characterization of the 
Christian conception of time.  Instead of progress being understood in religious terms of 
                                                 










   
iii.b.  Temporality and the coming community  
  Though the purpose of Agamben’s essay – to propose a complementary theory of 
temporality to Marx’s historical materialism – will not be explored here, the reasons for 
him to propose such a theory will help the understanding of the temporal situatedness of 
the coming community: a community whose ontological condition is not determined via 
predicate characteristics.  At the beginning of “Time and History: Critique of the Instant 
and the Continuum,” Agamben says: 
    …every culture is first and foremost a particular experience of time, and  
   no new culture is possible without an alteration of this experience.  The  
    original task of a genuine revolution, therefore, is never merely to “change  
   the world,” but also – and above all – to “change time.” (IH 99) 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, Agamben in The Coming Community proposes an 
ontology of impotentiality, which would render the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy 
inoperable and therefore dissolve the continual “violent contention” associated with this 
dualism.  The argument of whether Agamben’s proposal was in fact radical (or 
revolutionary) can be paused in order to acknowledge his intention in The Coming 
Community (and many of his other works) is to usurp and radicalize traditional 
philosophic interpretations.  It stands to reason, then, that given what Agamben says 
                                                 
34 In the chapter “Contemporary Challenges to the Idea of History” in Knowledge and Human Liberation: 
Towards Planetary Realizations, Ananta Kumar Giri gives a comparative reading of the experience of time 






above, altering our experience of time is key for such a revolution.  As Watkin says, 
“What is at issue is nothing less than a ‘new culture’ and the ‘revolutionary’ politics that 
might bring it about” (Watkin 95).35 
  By virtue of the term alone, coming community would seem to indicate that 
Agamben is proposing a community to come – one that is not existent in the present and 
will, at some moment in the future, become present.  However, (as we see with with 
Davis and prison abolition) this assumption is misguided. As Agamben makes clear, the 
coming community is not one which will become present in the future.  In the essay 
“Quodlibet: Giorgio Agamben’s Anti-Utopia” Carlo Salzani explains:  
     The ‘coming’ of the coming community is devoid of the tension toward  
    something that lies ahead, in the future, devoid of a linear understanding  
   of time that sees it as a cumulative progression. (223)   
Coming must be disconnected from a linear context or association.  It does not mean to 
come in the future; it means something closer to “presencing” or “becoming.”  The 
coming community is present for Agamben here and now.  Agamben is giving an 
ontological account of a form of “singularity without identity that he terms ‘whatever 
being’ and in the…community he terms the ‘coming community’” (C 144).  Alex Murry 
in his book Giorgio Agamben characterizes the coming community as “always in the 
process of coming, [it] is here in the present, yet whose potential hasn’t been grasped” 
(51).  The parameters for Agamben are about recognition and use not about present non-
existence and future existence.     
                                                 
35 Ontology and politics are inextricably linked for Agamben, and this is discussed at the end of this 






iii.c.  Temporal structure of Davis’s prison abolition 
  Davis’s use of the term abolition is meant to invoke the slave abolition 
movements of Western Europe and the Americas and thus keep at the fore the connection 
between prison abolition to liberation.
36
  Temporality offers one way of distinguishing 
between two predominant slave abolitionist tactics: gradualism and immediatism.
37
  
Generally speaking, gradualists saw advantages to a slow and measured transition from 
legal, chattel slavery to emancipation.
38
  Some abolitionists, like William Lloyd Garrison, 
grew frustrated with this approach and believed it to be complacent to the brutal system 
of chattel slavery.  As Steven Best in The Politics of Total Liberation: Revolution for the 
Twentieth-Firth Century details, Garrison, “a former indentured white servant, started a 
prominent abolitionist newsletter, the Liberator, on January 1, 1831, which he published 
for 35 years” (27).  As Garrison made clear in the first editorial, “the philosophies of 
gradualism” were “complacenc[ies] of reform,” and he “called for the ‘immediate and 
complete emancipation of all slaves’” (Best 27).  In “William Lloyd Garrison at Two 
Hundred: His Radicalism and His Legacy for Our Time,” David Blight explains that 
those in agreement with Garrison “converted to immediatism, [which is] the argument 
that slaves had the inherent right to their freedom instantly” (5).   
                                                 
36 Liberation is addressed in the next section of this chapter in further detail. 
37 There are other ways of distinguishing among the tactics of the slave abolition movements (e.g. 
militant/non-militant).  David Walker and Henry Highland Garnet were among the “most militant voices 
advocate[ing] the use of force as a necessary or legitimate tactic of struggle and self-defense” (Best 26). 
38 In the 2nd edition of the Thoughts on civilization, and the gradual abolition of slavery in Africa and the 
West Indies (1791), the author is sympathetic to gradualism on the basis that non-European peoples, 
“natives” and “Africans” in this case, are barbarous and would be incompatible with living in a civil society 
which has the rule of law.  Referring to Africans, the author states: “I will show that the reformation of 
habits and manners must be gradual, and that the world is not yet ripe enough for its emancipation.  I firmly 
believe, that a sudden and unqualified abolition of slavery everywhere would in many respects, be 






   Both gradualism and immediatism purported to have the same social and political 
goal: to abolish the system of slavery.  However, each faction differed with respect to the 
temporal notion of duration.  For the gradualists, an extended or longer duration between 
the present situation at hand (slavery) and the future goal (emancipation) was accepted 
and embraced as a tangible, effective approach.  On the other hand, immediatists believed 
that moderation and incremental steps only prolonged the unjustified misery of enslaved 
human beings.  Immediatists perceived any extended duration between chattel slavery 
and emancipation as unacceptable.  For some immediatists, like Garrison, gradualism 
became interpreted as merely reforming the system of slavery and not the abolishment of 
slavery.  As can be seen, the interpretation of the temporal notion of duration of the 
gradualists and the immediatists had significant consequences in the discussion and 
struggle for abolition.  Whether warranted or not, the acceptance and promotion of an 
extended duration by the gradualists caused the immediatists to call into question the 
gradualists’ stated commitment to slave abolition.   
      Thinking about the slave abolition movements in terms of duration offers a basis 
of comparison for Davis’s prison abolition.  Stephan J. Hartnett attempts to distinguish 
Davis from the gradualist and immediatist approaches.  It is very much the case that 
“‘abolition’ in the postmodern sense does not mean what it meant in the antebellum 
slavery debates” (Hartnett 511).  Hartnett says quite plainly, and accurately, that Davis’s 
“‘abolition’…does not mean the immediate…abolition of the prison system” (511).  This 
is true to the extent that Davis is not advocating for the release of every inmate at this 
precise now-instant.   






After this, Hartnett’s comparison and attempt to distinguish Davis’s abolition 
temporally from immediatism and gradualism breaks down.  He says that Davis’s 
abolition means a “long-term radical transformation, its dramatic downsizing, its 
eventually being turned into something else” (Hartnett 511).  To begin, this description in 
no way differs on the basis of duration substantially from gradualism (i.e. “long-term” 
and “eventually”).  Similar to the criticism of the gradualists by the immediatists – the 
gradualists were complacent to the slave system by advocating measured reforms – 
prison abolitionists tend to be critical of the focus on prison reform.  Davis explains that 
the public discourse about prison expansion and prison conditions emphasizes 
“generating changes that will produce a better prison system,” and “frameworks that rely 
exclusively on reforms help to produce the stultifying idea that nothing lies beyond the 
prison” (APO 20).  I agree with Hartnett’s motivation to differentiate Davis’s prison 
abolition on temporal grounds from the gradual and immediate methodologies of the 
slave abolition movement, but this particular description of Davis’s abolition does not do 
the work it needs to make clear the difference between Davis’s abolition and gradualism.   
  Hartnett argues that the “course of action” pursued by Davis and other prison 
abolitionists is “in terms that are less immediatist or gradualist than futurist” (511).  The 
problem with this classification is it confuses the understanding of futurism and 
misplaces Davis’s temporal elasticity for a future-only goal.  Futurism is most commonly 
associated with the artistic movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
Anne Simon says, for the Italian futurists like F.T. Marinetti, the “most virulent article in 
the Credo of the Futurists is their attack on tradition.  They have a horror of all that is old 






term abolition – which is what Hartnett is trying to situate – is precisely the opposite of 
what it means to reject all antecedent forms.  Davis revises the usage of abolition, but she 
is very clear that it is supposed to invoke former slave abolition movements.    
   Furthermore, even if Hartnett is not drawing upon the principles of the artistic 
movement Futurism, labeling Davis a futurist connotes that prison abolition adopts a 
future-only orientation; that is, Hartnett’s classification of Davis’s prison abolition as 
futurism assumes there is a rigid distinction between present conditions and future 
conditions and with an implicit futural favoritism.  This understanding mischaracterizes 
Davis and other prison abolitionists.  As Eric A. Stanley explains in the “Introduction” to 
Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison Industrial Complex,  
    For [prison abolitionists], abolition is not simply a reaction to the [prison  
   industrial complex] but a political commitment that makes the PIC  
    impossible.  To this end, the time of abolition is both yet to come and  
    already here. (8)   
According to this description, prison abolition is part of present conditions and future 
conditions.  Stanley further explains,  
   Abolition is not some distant future but something we create in every  
    moment when we say no to the traps of empire and yes to nourishing  
    possibilities dreamed of and practiced by our ancestors and friends. (36) 
Prison abolitionists, like Davis, do not hold the occurrence of prison abolition to be 
inexistent in the present, and at some point in the future, will be existent.  Moreover, to 
“nourish possibilities dreamed of and practiced by our ancestors” demonstrates the 






rejected or dismissed.  Time is not constituted by complete or absolute, separable 




Part II: Liberation 
iv. Liberation 
 The brief outlines of Davis and Agamben in the previous section (iii. Time of 
liberation) describe how each deviate from the normative understanding of time as 
temporal passing in a similar manner.  To think of Agamben’s coming community as an 
occurrence in the future that the present is moving towards would be a fundamental 
misconception.  The coming community is actively presencing. Similarly, to relegate 
prison abolition to the status of being non-existent in the present and as something which 
will come to be existent at some future moment in time is to ignore the temporal nuance 
of prison abolition; that is, it is already an existent in the here and now and in the future.  
The next step is to look more closely at how Davis and Agamben uses of time inform, 
influence, and complement each thinker’s conception of liberation. 
  
 iv.a. Prison abolition and indefinite liberation 
  As we have seen, Davis can be differentiated from the slave abolitionist 
movements of immediatism and gradualism by undermining the normative conception of 
time as temporal passing with which those movements were operating.  The temporal 
assertions by both slave abolition movements and Davis has further implications 
                                                 
39 In an interview with Frank Barat, Davis says: “It is essential to resist the depiction of history as the work 
of heroic individuals in order for people today to recognize their potential agency as a part of an ever-






regarding how liberation functions.  The struggle for the abolition of slavery – as well as 
revolts, insurrection, and escapes – were struggles for liberation.  Slave abolitionists 
called for and fought for the emancipation of slaves: the end of the practice of racial, 
chattel slavery.  This goal was, on these terms, accomplished with the Emancipation 
Proclamation and the adopting of the Thirteenth Amendment.  The struggle for liberation 
was achieved when the legal, racial system of slavery became illegal.      
However, Davis claims that prison abolition exists already and in the future, and this 
temporal assertion has consequences on the understanding of an abolition democracy: the 
political and social organization absent of the PIC.  Prison abolitionists, like Davis, 
describe the PIC as repressive, violent, exploitive, and dehumanizing.  Abolishing the 
PIC would therefore have a liberatory effect; it would be the alleviation of the forces 
identified as causing or perpetuating a condition considered oppressive and brutal.  Davis 
specifically addresses the importance of the “creation of communities of struggle,” which 
actively opposes the PIC as a means for bringing about communities of liberation (AD 
108).  The question at hand is what do Davis’s temporal claims about prison abolition (i.e. 
the inability for it to be thought of in terms of duration as gradualism and immediatism of 
slave abolition) indicate about the struggle and achievement of liberation?   
  First, prison abolition is already present due to the fact that the conception itself 
has already been imagined; it is something that people are actively engaged in creating.  
The abolition of the PIC may not be an existential global accomplishment, but the reality 
of the idea of prison abolition is very much present.  Second, there are processes 
underway that currently seem unrelated to prison abolition or criminal justice but are 






or reaching a goal, there never reaches a moment in time when liberation is ultimately or 
absolutely achieved in the sense it was for the slave abolition movements.  As Davis 
explains in an interview on February 25, 2015:     
    I think the idea that there is a particular point in time where all our dreams  
   are fulfilled is sort of an anathema to the whole notion of liberation, which  
   I see as becoming larger and more capacious as we struggle…Why can we  
    not imagine this happening indefinitely? (ILH)  
If the struggle for liberation is indefinite, the achievement of liberation never comes to 
full fruition in traditional terms.  Davis did gesture at this idea in Abolition Democracy: 
“what we manage to do each time we win a victory is not so much to secure some change 
once and for all, but rather to create new terrains for struggle” (21).  Prison abolition is 
thus a continuous becoming and should not be classified or represented in final or 
complete terms.  Given this interpretation, Davis at the very least obscures the notion of 
purpose in regards to prison abolition.  There is a lack of purpose in the sense that even if 
a prisonless existence, an abolition democracy, is a global reality, the struggle for 
liberation continues in currently unimagined ways.  
  Continuous struggle and the non-achievement of liberation works for Davis given 
the object of her critique, those who are to be liberated, and the dual movement (negative 
and positive) of abolition.  We can again go back to slave abolitionism as a basis for 
comparison.  The practice of racial, chattel slavery in the United States was a practice of 
bondage.  Slaves were considered property
40
 and had no authority over their own bodies, 
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their familial ties, their expressions, and their movements. Slave abolitionists often 
critiqued other systems or practices which contributed to the desire for such a brutal and 
degrading practice – most notably the desire for cheap labor to perform physically 
intensive work for the purpose of maximizing profits/wealth.
41
  However, slave abolition 
concentrated on ending the system of racial, chattel slavery.   
  Davis’s object of critique is much more complex.  Davis is not solely, nor even 
primarily, focused on the legal use of incarceration facilities as such.  Davis is more 
concerned with the conditions that allow for incarceration facilities to be considered an 
inevitable part of society.  Since the abolition of the practice of incarceration does not 
map directly onto the abolition of the practice of slavery, the people for whom liberation 
is necessary is more expansive.  For slave abolitionists, slaves were in need of 
emancipation.  The liberation at stake is not limited to incarcerated peoples or those 
under criminal supervision.  For Davis, the imagination of the greater population must 
also be liberated in order to abolish the conditions that perpetuate the PIC.   
And finally, as discussed in Chapter Two, prison abolition is both a negative and positive 
process.  Inspired by DuBois who believed that “abolition [is] not…a mere negative 
process, one of tearing down.  It is ultimately about creating new institutions,” Davis 
believes abolition must include creations of social structures and institutions with 
radically
42
 different intent (Ben-Moshe 85).  The expansion of the object of critique from 
                                                                                                                                                 
related to this issue of property.  “But, say friends of this system, the Slaves are the private property of 
individuals; and would [abolitionists] interfere with the sacredness of private property?” (4). 
41 The pamphlet “On slavery, and the duty of the religious public with reference to the question of 
immediate of gradual abolition” (1830) notes that “slavery is advocated on the plea of necessity – there 
were we to abandon the system, we should strike a fatal blow at the prosperity of our West Indian Colonies, 
so intimately connected with the commercial interests of the country” (4). 






prison to the PIC, those who are to be liberated, and the negative and positive aspect of 
abolition compliments the temporal structure of Davis’s prison abolition.  Davis is 
proposing an existential alteration – a transforming which is always on-going, and the 
struggle for liberation is indefinite.  
 
 iv.b. Agamben and religious traditions 
   An issue with looking at Agamben’s coming community in terms of liberation 
proper is that, unlike Davis, Agamben rarely uses the term. However, Agamben, taking 
aim at the “violent contention” of the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy of community 
formation, is implicitly criticizing current paradigms of thinking and modes of human 
organization.  “Violent contention” is a contingent, mutating force affecting excluded 
individuals negatively so rendering that force inoperable can reasonably be interpreted as 
a liberating act or having a liberating effect.   
  Agamben does speak in religiously coded language of salvation, redemption, and 
the messianic – forms of religious liberation – throughout his corpus.  As we have seen, 
the coming community does not operate using the normative conception of time as linear 
temporal passing.  It causes us to dismantle the idea of the present being prior to salvation 
or redemption at some point in the future.  Matthew Abbott in The Figure of the World 
explains, “redemption for [Agamben] would constitute not some exceptional event of 
salvation, but rather a suspension of the dialectic of danger and salvation” (3).43    
   
                                                 
43 Agamben also uses the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989; this is discussed in Chapter Five, which 






iv.b.1: Catholic limbo 
“From Limbo,” the second chapter in The Coming Community, Agamben cites the 
Catholic notion of limbo as an example where this suspension already occurs; in other 
words, limbo offers an example, or paradigm, where the dialectic of condemned/saved is 
rendered inoperable.  According to Catholicism, everyone is born with the mark (or guilt) 
of original sin as a result of Adam’s and Eve’s transgression against God’s 
commandment; they ate fruit from a forbidden tree.  Francis A. Sullivan, in “The 
Development of Doctrine about Infants who Die Unbaptized,” explains, “infants can be 
freed from this guilt only through the redeeming grace of Christ, which they would 
receive in the sacrament of baptism” (3).  Augustine argued that if infants or young 
children die before receiving the sacrament of baptism, and the mark of original sin is not 
erased, these infants and young children are condemned to hell.  The Catholic Church 
rejected this Augustinian model.  As Sullivan documents,  
    Pope Innocent III…declared in 1201 that the penalty for original sin is  
   deprivation of the vision of God, while the torments of hell are suffered by  
    those guilty of actual sin…and the term ‘limbo’…was adopted as the  
    name of the state for infants who died unbaptized. (4) 
Though limbo is not, nor ever has been, a part of the official teaching of the Catholic 
Church, limbo became an exceedingly popular notion as the place for souls of unbaptized 
infants and young children.   
   According to Saint Thomas, “the punishment of unbaptized children who die with 
no other fault than original sin cannot be an afflictive punishment, like that of hell, but 






(CC 5).  It is precisely the “punishment of privation” which, according to Agamben, 
renders the terms of the damned/saved dialectic inoperative.  As Agamben explains:  
    The inhabitants of limbo, in contrast to the damned, do not feel pain from  
   this lack [of the vision of God]: Since they have only natural and no  
    supernatural knowledge, which is implanted in us at baptism, they do not  
   know that they are deprived of the supreme good, or, if they do know (as  
    others claim) they cannot suffer from it. (CC 5)  
The souls in limbo are not suffering; God has not abandoned or forgotten them – like the 
damned who suffer with the knowledge they are outside the light of God.  Agamben says 
that “God has not forgotten them, but rather they have always already forgotten God” 
(CC 5-6).  Since the souls of limbo were never exposed to the divine in the first place, the 
punishment of privation is a joyous experience.  “Neither blessed like the elected, nor 
hopeless like the damned, they are infused with a joy and with no outlet” (CC 6). 
   In order to understand how the damned/saved dialectic is suspended altogether in 
Agamben’s conception of limbo, we need to recall his discussion about the Irreparable 
covered in the Chapter Three.  The Irreparable, being-thus, is pure exposure; it is beyond 
repair and is as it is.  The souls in limbo are irreparable; they are beyond repair.  
Salvation is useless because the souls in limbo were never included within the 
damned/saved dialectic.      
  Agamben works from within the Western religious and philosophic tradition and 
re-interprets notions, like limbo, to render traditional problems inoperative.  In the 
discussion of limbo, Agamben is not arguing for or against the theological or rational 






and exhibits how the concept of limbo suspends the dialectic of unsaved/saved or 
condemned/redeemed.  If the dialectic is suspended, then the complications associated 
with it, or which come from it, (e.g. questions like who is damned, and who is saved?) 
dissolve.  Agamben is establishing an alternative way of interpreting in order to open up 
new possibilities. 
  
iv.b.2: Buddhism and nirvāṇa 
Though Agamben’s references to non-Abrahamic religious traditions are sparse in 
his corpus, two brief – almost identical – statements occur in The Coming Community.  
The first reads: “There is nothing new about the thesis that the Absolute is identical to 
this world.  It was stated in its extreme form by Indian logicians with the axiom, 
‘Between Nirvana and the world there is not the slightest difference’” (CC 53).   Then, in 
the Appendix, Agamben writes,  
    This is why Indian logicians said that sicceitas, the being-thus of things,  
    was nothing but their being deprived of any proper nature, their vacuity,  
    and that between the world and Nirvana there is not the slightest  
    difference. (CC 103) 
Since Agamben supplies no citation, the identity of the Indian logicians and therefore the 
specific school or discipline the logicians were working from remains speculative.  
Steven DeCaroli in “The Idea of Awakening: Giorgio Agamben and the Nāgārjuna 
References” believes Agamben is invoking Nāgārjuna – “the principle founder of the 
Mādhyamika, or Middle Way, school” of Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism (DeCaroli 






one of his other books, Idea of Prose.  The other reason is much more substantial.  
DeCaroli says,  
    Whereas in earlier forms of Buddhism, awakening was equated with a  
   complete escape from saṃsāra (the everyday lived world of fixation,  
    habit, and suffering), the teaching of emptiness in the Mahāyāna tradition,  
    and especially within the stanzas that comprise [Nāgārjuna’s]  
   Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, brought about a radical change by collapsing the  
    distinction between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. (130)     
Very early traditions of Buddhism maintained a separation between normative, embodied 
existence and nirvāṇa – a state or place of transcendence.  Setting aside whether 
DeCaroli’s characterization of Nāgārjuna’s writings and intellectual effect are accurate, it 
is the case that later forms of Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism did begin to speak of 
nirvāṇa as not independent from saṃsāra.  If there is no difference between the world 
(saṃsāra) and nirvāṇa, as Agamben states twice in The Coming Community, then the 
problem of how to get from one place (the world) to another place 
(transcendence/salvation/liberation) is rendered inoperative.  As DeCaroli says:  
    But what, in fact, needs to be done does not involve the reclamation of a  
   lost world, or the establishment of a new one, but rather the adoption of a  
   new mode of perceiving and inhabiting the one we are now in.  Nirvāṇa is  
   not a place but a way of being, a manner of awareness characterized by the  
    vulnerability of letting go of that which we never had. (131) 
The micro-analyses of limbo and nirvāṇa help us to see how liberation functions with 






changing the world in order to create a new, liberated world in the future repudiates the 
temporality of the coming community discussed in section iii.  “How, after all, can only 
look forward to a moment one already occupies?” (DeCaroli, 123).   
  Davis makes a similar claim.  In an opening address at the 2011 conference of the 
International Herbert Marcuse Society, speaking of the open letter Tahir Square 
dissenters wrote to Occupy Wall Street protesters, Davis said she was reminded of the 
last line of June Jordan’s “Poem for South African Women”: we are the ones we have 
been waiting for (CR 434).  Davis believes this line to be particularly crucial for 
understanding the nature of liberation struggles – including prison abolition.  Davis then 
says this line to the audience as a declarative statement: “we are the ones we have been 
waiting for” (CR 434).  What does it mean for “us” to be the ones we have been waiting 
for?  It means that those who are participating in struggles for liberation are actively 
bringing to fruition the type of communities, ideologies, and practices they have been 
waiting for.  In other words, prison abolitionists take the abolition of the prison industrial 
complex – a condition which is not-yet – and do not relegate it to a moment in the future 
but make it present now.  The alteration is one of perception and cognition; it is the 
potential not-to – to render assumed, conceptual frameworks inoperable by undermining 
the cognitive and linguistic scaffolds employed to perpetuate such frameworks.   
 
v.  Imagination revisited 
   Prison abolition is a necessary feature of Davis’s abolition democracy.  As 
outlined in the chapter on Davis, the imagination plays a crucial role in Davis’s critique 






democracy signals less a series of policy reforms and more a conceptual shift – a much 
broader and more complicated goal and one which is difficult to try and predict or plan.  
Moreover, Davis and Agamben both propose that a conceptual shift or change needs to 
occur in order to for us to recognize an already existent abolition democracy for Davis 
and coming community for Agamben.  Davis locates the imagination as being that which 
can prompt (and impede) this conceptual shift.  For Agamben, it is clear that how humans 
think needs to be altered in order to render inoperative cognitive misunderstandings that 
affect such notions as resistance and the state.
44
  In The Coming Community, Agamben 
does not say that the “imagination” would be that which prompts this alternative way of 
thinking.  The context in which Agamben speaks about the imagination is a bit different 
than Davis, but it is nonetheless just as important for thinking about the conceptual shift 
needed in order to recognize the coming community.  Agamben in his “Essay on the 
Destruction of Experience” in the book Infancy and History links the “resulting reversal 
of the status of the imagination” to “the change that has taken place in the meaning of 
experience” (IH 27).  Prior to unpacking how Agamben understands imagination, we 
must first understand the claims Agamben makes about the transformation of the 
meaning of experience. 
  Agamben begins the “Essay on the Destruction of Experience” by stating: “The 
question of experience can be approached nowadays only with an acknowledgement that 
it is no longer accessible to us” (IH 15).  Referencing and expanding on Walter 
Benjamin’s notion of the poverty of experience, Agamben claims that experience for 
modern people has been destroyed.  “As long ago as 1933 Benjamin had accurately 
                                                 






diagnosed this ‘poverty of experience’ of the modern age; he located its origins in the 
catastrophe of the First World War” (IH 15).  Agamben agrees with Benjamin about the 
diagnosis but claims that for “[t]oday, however, we know that the destruction of 
experience no longer necessitates a catastrophe” (IH 15).  Agamben believes that 
everyday occurrences still cannot be “translated into experience” (IH 15).  No matter how 
“entertaining or tedious, unusual or common place, harrowing or pleasurable” the day’s 
events are “none of them will have become experience” (IH 16).  As Catherine Mills in 
The Philosophy of Giorgio Agamben explains: “Agamben claims that the contemporary 
age is marked by the destruction or loss of experience, in which the banality of everyday 
life cannot be experienced per se but only undergone” (23).  For Agamben, then, one 
does not experience things like going to work, eating lunch, and reading the news but 
undergoes these moments as a process.  The purpose of Agamben’s essay is to recover a 
forgotten meaning of experience and attempt to render a new conception of experience, 
and unlike Benjamin who connects the destruction of experience to the First World War 
(i.e. a catastrophe), Agamben “argues that this condition is in part brought about by the 
rise of modern science and the split between the subject of experience and of knowledge 
that it entails” (Mills 23).   
  For Agamben, the shift from the meaning of experience in the “traditional sense” 
(i.e. Antiquity/classical thought) and the meaning of experience that “was implicit in the 
founding project of modern science” is marked by a change in the understanding of the 
subject (IH 19).  Experience, for Antiquity (via the Greek philosophers Plato and 
Aristotle), was understood as separate from knowledge whereas “in its search for 






‘method’; that is, the pathway – of knowledge” (IH 22).  With the birth of modern 
science, the response to experience as being uncertain was to “displac[e] experience as 
far as possible outside the individual: onto instruments and numbers” (IH 20).  
Experience became that which could be measured, known, and certain.  Agamben claims 
that “[t]raditional experience…remains faithful to this separation of experience and 
science” and does so by pointing out that experience and science were attached to 
different subjects for classical thought (IH 21).  “The subject of experience was common 
sense, something existing in every individual…while the subject of science is the noūs or 
the active intellect, which is separate from experience, ‘impassive’ and ‘divine’” (IH 20).  
In modern science, these different subjects become one.  The subject of experience and 
the subject of knowledge transform into a single subject “which is none other than their 
conjunction at an abstract Archimedean point: the Cartesian cogito, consciousness” (IH 
22). 
  Returning to the imagination, we can begin to see what Agamben means when he 
says: “Nothing can convey the extent of the change that has taken place in the meaning of 
experience so much as the resulting reversal of the status of the imagination” (IH 27).  
The imagination for classical thought had authority, and in unlike modern science, was 
not thought of as unreal.  “For Antiquity, the imagination which is now expunged from 
knowledge as ‘unreal’, was the supreme medium of knowledge” (IH 27).  Agamben 
names the importance of dreams in classical thought as evidence for this connection 
between the imagination and knowledge.   
    And since, according to Antiquity, it is the imagination which forms  






    dreams have in the ancient world…and to efficacious knowledge. (IH 27)   
Rather than the imagination being the way or mode of knowledge, experience is placed 
outside of the subject and considered measurable.  For classical thought, the imagination 
“[a]s the intermediary between the senses and the intellect, enabling, in phantasy, the 
union between the sensible form and the potential intellect, it occupies in ancient and 
medieval culture exactly the same role that our culture assigns to experience” (IH 27).   
  Though Agamben’s main concern in this essay is experience, his comments about 
the imagination are important.  If the purpose of Agamben’s essay is to recover and then 
attempt to rethink the concept of experience, then it is clear that implicit in this attempt is 
a recovering and rethinking of the concept of the imagination.  Like Davis, Agamben 
gives high weight to the imagination both negatively and positively.  Davis critiques the 
imagination for being limited and obstructing human possibilities.  Agamben traces how 
the West currently thinks of the imagination.  The way the imagination is considered is as 
an obstruction.  It is a subtle difference, but they are interconnected.  Davis’s critique is 
focused on use: how is the imagination used as a tool in the act of thinking.  Is it limited 
and preventing possibilities, or is it expanding possibilities/generating creative 
approaches and conclusions? Agamben is focused on the explicit and implicit meanings a 
culture has about the concept of the imagination: how is the term “imagination” defined, 
and what is its relationship to knowledge – if any?  Agamben is focused upon the use of 
the concept of the imagination and its development within a culture over an extended 
period of time.   
   In terms of the positive aspect, Davis believes the imagination is the impetus for 






possibilities for change.  Agamben’s entire corpus is filled with similar moves; that is, “it 
is typical of his thought [that] the site of danger or destruction is also the site of salvation” 
(Mills 23).  For Agamben, it is the concept of experience that is both the problem and the 
solution not the imagination as it is for Davis.  However, as we have seen, the meaning of 
the imagination is integral to the understanding of experience, and thus an alteration in 
the meaning of the imagination would affect the understanding of experience.   
 
vi.  Political Ontology 
  Political and social action motived by discourse of creating a “new world” adopts 
the normative conception of time as temporal passing.  The focus is how to get from the 
present world to the new (future) world.  For Agamben, according to DeCaroli,  
    the problem is in the way we occupy this world, the way we  
   comport ourselves toward it, our disposition, or more philosophically  
    speaking the way our ontological commitment, which shape how we  
    conceive of ourselves and the world, become political commitments. (129- 
   30) 
For this reason, ontology is political for Agamben.  Proposing a re-interpretation of 
ontology as impotentiality is not an inconsequential, abstract thought experiment.  
Matthew Abbott in The Figure of this World: Agamben and the Question of Political 
Ontology defines Agamben as a political ontologist.  According to Abbott, political 
ontology posits 






   task for thought is not to prescribe action, but to practice a thinking that  
   tracks the conditions of the possibility of radical change. (188) 
The description of political ontology is particularly helpful in considering not only 
Agamben’s work but Davis’s as well.  From what we have discussed about Agamben’s 
The Coming Community, (e.g. whatever being, irreparable, limbo), prescriptive action is 
clearly not his focus. Abbott goes on to say that for the political ontologist, “the political 
task is not to put theoretical or philosophic ideas ‘into practice’ but to think practically by 
experimenting with new political forms” (Abbott 188).  Davis clearly experiments with 
new political forms, but she does not address nor demonstrate effective means of 
complicating the discourse to advance the prison abolitionist project.  Agamben’s 
rendering of ontology in terms of impotentiality and its political consequences on self and 
community is a demonstrative practice of imaginative thinking that preserves Davis’s 
non-linear temporality and her claim regarding the struggle for liberation as indefinite.  
Thus, Agamben offers a possible blueprint for where to begin the cognitive re-orientation 
vital for the prison abolitionist project: abolishing the conditions which allow for the 






CHAPTER 5. RESISTENCE, LAW, AND THE STATE 
i.  Introduction 
Herman Wallace, Robert King, and Albert Woodfox are known as the Angola 
Three. They were imprisoned in the early 1970’s in a maximum-security Louisiana State 
Penitentiary, known simply as “Angola” – named for the African country of many of its 
earlier enslaved occupants. The sprawling prison is on the grounds of a former slave 
plantation and to this day inmates work in the prison’s fields picking cotton overseen by 
armed guards on horseback.  Wallace first went to prison in 1971 for armed robbery. 
Wallace, along with Woodfox and King, formed one of the first prison chapters of the 
Black Panther Party – organizing inmates to oppose the systemic violence and sexual 
slavery that pervaded the institution. 
  Wallace and Woodfox were convicted for the 1972 murder of a prison guard, 
Brent Miller.  No physical evidence linked the men to the crime. A bloody fingerprint at 
the scene, which belonged neither to Wallace nor Woodfox, was ignored by authorities. 
Wallace and Woodfox believe they were targeted by officials because of their political 
organizing work. After their conviction in 1974, they were put in solitary confinement 
along with King, who was being punished for another crime.  King’s conviction would be 
overturned twenty-nine years later; all twenty-nine years served in solitary confinement.  






successfully appealed the judge’s decision or convened a grand jury to indict Woodfox 
and try him again.  Woodfox was finally released on February 16, 2016 after spending 
over forty-three years in solitary confinement. 
   On October 1, 2013, a Federal Judge ordered Wallace’s release and overturned his 
conviction due to an improperly chosen grand jury that excluded women jurors in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wallace was suffering with advanced stages of 
liver cancer and was given days to live by the time of his release. The state appealed the 
ruling, but the judge quickly responded with another order that said failure to release 
Wallace from custody would result in a judgment of contempt. So, at 7:30 p.m., the night 
of October 1, seventy-one year old Wallace was released from prison – after nearly forty-
two years in solitary confinement – and left in an ambulance that took him directly to a 
New Orleans’ hospital.  Attempts at gaining compassionate release were denied as early 
as July 2013 when Wallace’s condition became extremely grave.            
  Fifty-eight hours after his release, on the morning of Friday, October 4, 2013, 
Wallace died in the hospital.  Family, friends, and supporters feared the advanced stages 
of his illness would prevent him from even knowing he was released from prison.  The 
people surrounding Wallace said he uttered these words in the hospital before he died: “I 
am free. I am free.”  
  At the time of his death, Wallace served more time in consecutively solitary 
confinement than any other U.S. inmate.  Within the first forty-eight hours of his release, 
District Attorney Sam D’Aquilla was able to get a grand jury to re-indict Wallace.  The 
swiftness the state of Louisiana moved to re-indict Wallace, who was hours away from 






the prison guard who was killed publicly supporting Wallace’s claims to innocence was 
excessively cruel.  On October 5, 2013, D’Aquilla responded to an email I had sent to 
him
45
 in the following way:  
    [G]lad for your input. [H]e was a murderer and it's sad he could not fulfill  
    his obligation to the state of Louisiana.  Sam 
What does it mean to have an obligation to the state?  Why was nearly forty-two years of 
solitary confinement considered to be unsatisfactory for the state?  Why did the district 
attorney, a representative of the state of Louisiana, move to quickly to re-indict Wallace?  
  The purpose of this chapter is to contextualize the state’s overreaction to 
Wallace’s release using Davis’s analysis of the political prisoner, the history of the 
struggle for black liberation as it relates to the law, and Agamben’s characterization of 
the incident at Tiananmen Square in 1989 as offering a display, or gesture, of the coming 
community.  The district attorney’s actions towards Wallace and his insistence that 
Wallace had an obligation to the state is a micro-level example of Agamben’s re-
interpretation of the resistance at Tiananmen Square.  In the previous chapters, Agamben 
offered a way to alter our cognitive framework about ontology that would aid in the 
imagining of a prisonless society.  This chapter ends with a suggestion of a strategy for 
resistance that would align and advance the prison abolitionist project by undermining the 
racial and economic inequality and oppression that define the PIC.  
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ii.  Political prisoners and the state 
   The goals accompanying Davis’s aforementioned “networks of resistance” and 
“communities of struggle” are political, and the target of criticism is most often 
hegemonic practices believed to be unjust and are often enshrined with the blessing of the 
state.  The state is the apparatus of governance of a particular geo-political collective 
generally associated with a nation and has identifiable – though malleable – boarders.  
Laws are articulated, applied, and enforced through the state or one of its sanctioned 
apparatuses.  Laws are neither just nor unjust and do not necessarily apply in the same 
manner to all individuals that constitute members (or residents) of a particular state.  
Davis rightly points out that “we naturally assume that justice and equality are 
necessarily produced through law.  But the law on its own cannot create justice and 
equality” (AD 92).   
  The political prisoner, for Davis, has a unique relationship to the law and 
therefore also to the state.  Prior to apprehension, the political prisoner is a political 
dissenter.  In the essay, “Political Prisoners, Prisons, and Black Liberation,” first 
published in 1971, Davis writes, that the dissenter’s “words or deeds have in one form or 
another embodied political protests against the established order and have consequently 
brought [the dissenter] into acute conflict with the state” (41).  The movement from 
political dissenter, or activist, to political prisoner can happen whether or not the 
dissenter has broken any laws.  Regardless of whether a criminal offense was committed,  
    …the political prisoner has violated the unwritten law which prohibits  
   disturbances and upheavals in the status quo…This unwritten law has been  






   constitutionally protected channels to educate, agitate, and organize the  
    masses to resist. (PP 41) 
Though the political prisoner becomes incarcerated for an alleged criminal act (i.e. 
transgressing a written law), the transgression, Davis argues, is actually the dissenter’s 
political act, which directly challenges the hegemonic order.  Therefore, “[t]he offense of 
the political prisoner is political boldness, the persistent challenging – legal or extra-legal 
– of fundamental social wrongs fostered and reinforced by the state” (PP 42). 
  Agamben reinforces Davis’s point about the gravity of the political dissenter’s 
challenge to the state.  For Agamben, law is already inscribed with considerations for the 
fact of the matter; that is, the rule of law is not nor ever has been transcendent.  Since 
antiquity, it has contained exceptions for particular circumstances.  In Agamben and the 
Politics of Human Rights, co-authors John Lechte and Saul Newman explain, “the law as 
such, for a very long time, made way for its own suspension in light of an arising 
situation (for example, a state of emergency)” (3).  Law allows for circumstances which 
actually halt the rule of law.  In a state of emergency, the facts of the matter are such that 
the rule of law is suspended.  Law is not transcendent; there is no pure or ideal form of 
law. 
  The example of the state of emergency highlights the predominant consideration 
for suspending the rule of law: security.  If the security of the nation-state is threatened, 
“[t]he law, in such a situation, is viewed as an ideal that must be suspended in light of the 
real state of affairs” (Lechte and Newman 4). 46  The political dissenter embodies this 
threat to the state as Davis described.  At some point along the political dissenter’s 
                                                 






activities, the rule of law is suspended and forms of illegal or extra-judicial surveillance, 
detainment, assassination, disappearance, and imprisonment are all used to mitigate the 
threat to the hegemonic order.   
Ultimately, for Agamben, the threat to the security of the state is constant.  As 
Lechte and Newman summarize:  
    The “situation” is what a state of emergency is intended to address.  But if  
   the situation is always prevalent, when it coincides with the norm – as is  
    the case with the security of the state – law, in a fundamental sense, is  
    continually suspended. (4) 
47
   
In the aftermath of attacks on the World Trade centers on September 11, 2001, 
warrantless surveillance, bulk collection of data, the Fisa court, President Obama’s 
command to assassinate U.S. citizens in a foreign country with drones without charge, 
and ethnic and religious profiling are instances in which the suspension of law in the 
United States has impacted citizens.  Such states of exception are also, as Agamben 
describes with reference to the camp, accompanied by horrendous violence.  Torture, 
disappearing people, war, mass executions, violent suppression of demonstrations, 
indefinite detention, medical neglect, and forced starvation are the means in which the 
state (any nation-state or localized sovereign entities) maintains itself in the name of 
security when the rule of law is suspended.   
  Security, on multifarious levels, centers on protection from perceived threats.  
People install home security systems in their homes to protect themselves and their 
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belongings from threats.  Individuals may have or carry weapons, like mace or guns, for 
protection from potential threats of attack.  Persons or communities may seek ways of 
protecting themselves from the violent threat of law enforcement or vice-versa.  The 
military is used for the purposes of security of the nation-state.  Threat, in most of these 
cases, is thought of in direct terms, whether ideological (e.g. political dissenters) and/or 
physical (e.g. bodily harm).  Davis claims:  
    One of our main challenges is to reconceptualize the notion of “security.”   
   How can we help to make the world secure from the ravages of global  
   capitalism?  This broader sense of security might involve debt relief for  
    Africa; it would mean an end to the juggernaut of privatization that  
   threatens the new society people in South Africa have been trying to build.   
    It would involve the shifting of priorities from the prison industrial  
    complex to education, housing, health care. (AD 89). 
 
iii.  Resistance: Black liberation and the law  
  Such social wrongs, in the context of the United States, have and continue to be 
perpetuated through the law: inscribing practices and behaviors legally permissible as 
well as explicitly defining those that are prohibited.  For example, it was the case that 
racial, chattel slavery was legally permitted; however, it was not the case that all citizens 
(at the time, narrowly defined) were required by law to own slave/s.  There was no state-
sanctioned punishment for those, who by law, were permitted to own slaves but did not.  
The law allowed for slave ownership but did not use punitive means to discourage the 






Act of 1850, on the other hand, explicitly deemed certain actions unlawful.  The fugitive 
slave laws were enacted to dissuade the practice of willfully or complacently aiding a 
slave’s escape through punitive means.  Speaking of the Underground Railroad, in the 
essay “Political Prisoners, Prisons, and Black Liberation,” Davis describes it as operating 
in “flagrant violation of the fugitive slave laws; those who were apprehended were 
subjected to severe penalties” (40). 
  Continuing in this essay, Davis notes the struggle for black liberation (from anti-
slavery resistance to the Twenty-first century) used both extra-legal and legal modes of 
resistance.  Violence and arson, escape, the Underground Railroad, were examples of 
extra-legal modes of resistance while abolitionist publications and organization, 
legislative efforts, purchasing one’s own or another’s freedom were legal modes of 
resistance to the lawful practice of chattel slavery.  As discussed in Chapter Two, not 
only is slavery still legally permitted, but new laws were created to ensure the 
continuation of anti-black racism and white supremacy.  The Black Codes being one 
instance of this and another being that “in the presence of now freed Black labor, the vote 
was offered to unpropertied White men” (Brewer & Heitzeg 631). The terrain for the 
struggle for black liberation evolved from emancipation to a focus on equal access to 
social and economic opportunities/resources; in addition, the struggle continued for an 
end to physical, verbal, and psychological intimidation as well as being tortured and 
killed, with impunity, for spectacle or sport.  During this period,  
   White supremacy in the laws was accomplished by the introduction of a  
   series of segregationist Jim Crow laws, a new model for essentialist racial  






    mandate that Blacks be according equality under the law because nature –  
    not man, not power, not violence – has determined their degraded status.  
   (Brewer and Heitzeg 631).   
The post-slavery and civil rights era are defined by their struggle against this adapted 
form of white supremacy – which existed across the United States, not just in the 
segregationist South.  The extra-legal and legal modes of resistance during this era 
included: sit-ins, violence, community education and health care, protests, court cases, 
legislative efforts, self-empowerment and expression, boycotts,
48




   Without question, the activism and resistance efforts of the civil rights era had 
positive impacts on legal, social, and cultural fronts.  However, as was the case with the 
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, there were unforeseen and unintended 
consequences of the changes linked with the civil rights era. Davis says, “The focus of 
the civil rights movement was precisely one effecting change in prevailing laws.  But at 
the same time, the law produced the limits of these possible changes” (AD 93).  Whether 
through extra-legal or legal modes of resistance, the success of changing prevailing laws 
need not lead to racial equality and equal protection under the law.  
    The grand achievement of civil rights was to purge the laws of its  
    reference to specific kinds of bodies, thus enabling racial equality before  
    the law.  But at the same time this process enabled racial inequality in the  
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    sense that the law was deprived of its capacity to acknowledge people as  
    racialized, as coming from racialized communities. (AD 93) 
Prior to the civil rights movement, the enforcement and application of the law and 
punitive consequences could be enacted in a blatantly racist manner.  Aspects of the civil 
rights movement sought to make the enforcement, application, and punitive consequences 
for breaking the law equal for all people.   
  Rather than ending legalized racial discrimination, the criminal justice system in 
the post-civil rights era has actually become the predominant means for continuing racial 
(and economic) hegemony.   
   The essentialist racist paradigm [has given] way to the new color-blind  
    racism where race and racism are ostensibly absent from the law and all  
    aspects of its enforcement.  The criminal justice system provides a  
    convenient vehicle for physically maintaining the old legally enforced  
    color lines. (Brewer & Heitzeg 633)   
Laws, and the criminal justice system more broadly, may be absent of references to race 
(and class) but its application and execution is targeted.  The hyper-policing of poor 
communities of color, over-loaded and sometimes professionally negligent public 
defenders, the corrosive use of plea deals, mandatory minimums, and felony three-strike 
laws have accelerated the incarceration rate in the post-civil rights era.   
  Though the term “mass incarceration” has gained popularity in academia and 
popular media, Wacquant takes issue with the term because it ignores the targeted use of 
the criminal justice system.  For Wacquant, “mass incarceration suggestions that 






flung far and wide across social and physical space” (78).  The United States does have 
the highest incarceration rate in the world, but for Wacquant, “mass” denotes “broad and 
indiscriminate” (78).  However, “the expansion and intensification of the activities of the 
police, courts, and prisons…[has] been finely targeted” by class, race, and place.  The 
appropriate term for Wacquant is hyperincarceration, and the “cumulative targeting has 
led to the hyperincarceration of one particular category” – lower class African American 
men from crumbling urban centers (78).  Trends in police activity are disjointed from 
trends in crime, mandatory minimum sentencing have been applied racially (e.g. crack vs. 
cocaine), the use of the legal system to remove children from school for behavioral 
reasons or charge them as adults are some of the ways that colorblind racism targets poor 
communities of color.  Given the direct line from racial, chattel slavery to free/cheap 
inmate labor discussed in Chapter Two, the “exploitation of Black labor continues, made 
permissible, indeed possible with the law” in the era of colorblind racism (Brewer & 
Heitzeg 638).       
  Davis acknowledges that racial and class-based exploitation and inequality have 
been able to continue – in different forms – despite changes in the law.  She believes that 
legal and/or extra-legal modes of resistance “need to find ways of contesting the absolute 
authority of the law” (AD 92).  She goes on to add, “This requires a dual strategy of 
taking up the law and recognizing its limitations in order to address that which the law 









 iv. Resistance: Tiananmen and moving prison abolition forward 
  The issues which Davis raises about the challenges of the legal and extra-legal 
modes of resistance that ultimately see law as being the recourse for combatting social 
wrongs is significant.  Law, as previously discussed, is written and executed by the state.  
The state and the PIC are not separate entities; they are intimately blended.  Prison 
abolition must rectify “the multifaceted role of the state in producing and entrenching 
marginality” (Wacquant 75).  As Davis has shown in the example of the civil rights 
movement and as Agamben has reinforced in his discussion of the state of emergency, 
law need not ensure equality and social justice – no matter how just the law appears to be 
written.  A mode of resistance that refuses to become placated or absorbed by changes in 
the law while simultaneously holding at the forefront the original target of the political 
dissenter’s criticism (i.e. the state) could be a viable route for realizing prison abolition 
and ultimately undermining what Davis describes as “the ravages of global capitalism” 
altogether (AD 89).  Agamben re-interprets the incident at Tiananmen Square as a mode 
of resistance that extended from an example of the coming community.  The ways in 
which Agamben identifies it as being radical, or revolutionary, offers a potential strategy 
for Davis and other prison abolitionists.  
  Agamben begins the final chapter of The Coming Community with the following 
question:   
    WHAT COULD be the politics of whatever singularity, that is, of a being  
   whose community is mediated not by any condition of belonging (being  






    conditions (a negative community, such as that recently proposed in  
    France by Maurice Blanchot), but by belonging itself? (CC 83)   
Agamben claims to have found “elements of a response” in the Tiananmen 
demonstrations (CC 88).  Prior to discussing what elements Agamben sees in the 
Tiananmen demonstrations that exhibit a “politics of whatever singularity,” it is 
important to reiterate Agamben’s rejection of Blanchot’s “negative community” (CC 88).  
As de la Durantye clarifies, “The ‘negative community’ that Blanchot invoked is, for 
Agamben, insufficient because it takes only the first step toward revisiting the idea of 
community; it knows what to reject but not what to put in its place” (170).  Mirroring 
Davis’s commitment to the negative-positive aspects of abolition, Agamben positively 
identifies in the Tiananmen Square incident as an extension of the coming community. 
  For Agamben, resistance which existentially challenges the authority of the state 
is an action, event, movement, or demonstration that is absent of a list of demands; that is, 
there is no determinate political goal at all.  In other words, using Agamben’s discourse 
of impotentiality, “what Agamben found exemplary about the demonstrations in Beijing 
was not what they demanded but what they did not demand” (de la Durantye 170).  
Agamben says of Tiananmen:  
     [w]hat was most striking about the demonstrations of the Chinese May  
   was the relative absence of determinate contents in their demands  
    (democracy and freedom are notions too generic and broadly defined to  
    constitute the real object of a conflict, and the only concrete demand, the  






This absence of political demands threatens the very existence of the state as such by 
undermining the state’s legitimacy as the mechanism for granting such political demands.   
    A society whose central strategy for control is observation and localized  
   containment sees its greatest threat in that which it cannot identify.  Such  
    seemingly disorganized and unmotivated resistance is, from this point of  
    view, the very last thing but anodyne. (de la Durantye 171)   
  Davis believes political goals, not political identities, are how we should form 
communities of struggle, and she also correctly admits that “once one becomes integrated 
into state structures, it becomes increasingly difficult to think about ways of developing 
radical oppositional practices” (CB 311).  This is why Davis takes an abolitionist 
approach to the PIC rather than a reformist approach.  A reformist wants to change 
particular aspects of a system – in this case the criminal justice system – but still assumes 
the validity of the system.  An abolitionist challenges the validity of the system itself.   
   Davis never explicitly states that a lack of political demands is a potential strategy 
to advance the prison abolitionist project, but Davis’s dismissal of non-essential identity 
and focus on political goals in concert with her concept of continuous struggle makes 
Agamben’s suggestion (i.e. lack of political demands) a plausible strategy.  Demands and 
goals are not equivalent.  To think of the individual-community in creative and 
experimental ways for the purposes of forming networks of resistance is already a 
political goal.
50
  A list of demands expressed to the state gives the impression that if the 
listed conditions were met, struggle for liberation would no longer be necessary.  In 
Tiananmen, Agamben sees the lack of political demands as an instance when the 
                                                 






protesters preferred not to; they preferred not to act in the expected way.  For Agamben, 
if nothing is demanded, the state is rendered inoperable.  That state no longer has validity 
if it is not being engaged.   
  The danger to the hegemonic order of Davis’s notion of liberation is less about 
economically, racially, politically, and/or ethnically oppressed peoples uniting to 
somehow overthrow capitalism or end racial and economic segregation.  Davis’s notion 
of liberation, as Agamben shows us, challenges the very existence of “political” as we 
have come to know it.  Agamben ends The Coming Community with an ominous remark 
that encapsulates the response of the state to the existential threat Tiananmen posed.     
  Whatever singularity, which wants to appropriate belonging itself, its own  
   being-in-language, and thus rejects all identity and every condition of  
   belonging, is the principal enemy of the State.  Wherever these  
    singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common there will be a  
    Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will appear. (CC 87). 
The brutal response of the state at Tiananmen offers a way to explain the actions of the 
state of Louisiana with respect to Herman Wallace outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter.  Wallace was not demonstrating, and he, himself, was physically unable to 
participate in the legal fight for his release.  However, hours away from death – slipping 
in and out of consciousness – the state of Louisiana’s legal apparatus was of no 
consequence to Wallace.  Wallace, because of illness, simply stopped engaging and 
validating the authority of the state.  As Agamben said, this is the greatest threat to the 
state.  The district attorney, acting on behalf of the state, moved with such resolve and 




control.  Wallace did not die in prison and inexplicably his “freed” status and the location 
of his death means he did not “fulfill his obligation to the state.”  
To take prison abolition serious is to take serious radical alterations in thinking, 
communicating, and acting.  The understanding and use of being, self, community, time, 
imagination, resistance, liberation is all part of the fodder of the transformation.  Prison 
abolition presents the same type of threat to the state as Tiananmen.  A prison abolitionist 
cannot create a list of demands to ask of the state.  Prison abolition threatens the state in a 
similar way that Tiananmen did, and as Agamben stated: “sooner or later, the tanks will 
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